Truman’s questions and comments during the meeting reflected his own continuing unease over the level of US casualties. The President also expressed concern that an invasion of the homeland by Americans could carry a racial connotation in the minds of the Japanese that would unite them for a fight to the finish. Stimson said there was every indication that this would be the case. At the meeting’s end, Truman said he agreed that the plan presented by the Chiefs was the best choice under the circumstances, but he added that he “had hoped there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other.”

Truman gave the go-ahead to continue preparations for the Kyushu operation; he said the decision on a follow-on invasion of Honshu could be made later. The minutes of the meeting indicate that an explicit rationale for this postponement was to enable the President and his advisers to take into account the impact of the Kyushu campaign and the anticipated Soviet entry into the war. 

Okinawa

The Battle of Okinawa did not end until June 22nd with the casualty numbers reported only later. President Truman remarked: “I do not want another Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other.” He was speaking of physical and mental injury with the knowledge that the American homefront wanted the troops home from the Pacific to join the returnees from the European Theater of Operations. The country was ready for war to be over and “life” to begin again. The last 16 years were the Great Depression followed by world war. The country wanted “normal.” But for the battle veterans of Iwo Jima and Okinawa “normal” was increasingly a distant memory. Some things can not be “unseen.”

The later Pacific island battles were taking a psychic toll. According to local authorities, at least 149,00 Okinawan people were killed, died by coerced suicide or went missing. It was, like Saipan, an experience when Allied forces faced civilian and child combatants. Some 2,000 school aged children died in combat, many as suicide bombers attaching explosive charges to tanks.

“More mental health issues arose from the Battle of Okinawa than any other battle in the Pacific during World War II. The constant bombardment from artillery and mortars coupled with the high casualty rates led to a great deal of personnel coming down with combat fatigue. Additionally, the rains caused mud that prevented tanks from moving and tracks from pulling out the dead, forcing Marines (who pride themselves on burying their dead in a proper and honorable manner) to leave their comrades where they lay. This, coupled with thousands of bodies both friend and foe littering the entire island, created a scent you could nearly taste. Morale was dangerously low by May and the state of discipline on a moral basis had a new low barometer for acceptable behavior. The ruthless atrocities by the Japanese throughout the war had already brought on an altered behavior (deemed so by traditional standards) by many Americans resulting in the desecration of Japanese remains, but the Japanese tactic of using the Okinawan people as human shields brought about a new aspect of terror and torment to the psychological capacity of the Americans” (SSgt Rudy Frame, “Okinawa: The Final Great Battle of World War II” | Marine Corps Gazette April 1985)

Japanese Defenses on Kyushu

One of the post-war critiques of the decision to drop the atomic bomb (although please remember this series assumes that no atomic weapons were ready) is that projected allied estimates of casualties became hyper-inflated after the war – notably President Truman’s comment that 1 million allied lives were saved. The critics can look (sometimes selectively) at April JWPC estimates, June JCS Planning estimates, as well as MacArthur’s estimates and conclude that Truman’s later claims were inflated as a means to justify his decision to drop the atomic bomb. It is their proper role as historians. Or they could simply do that “math” using the 35% Okinawa casualty rate (which in the end was actually 39%) against the known Japanese troop strength on Kyushu by the end of July 1945.

Because of our ULTRA code-breaking ability we were able to continually track the buildup of Japanese defenses on Kyushu. It was extensive and rapid. The April estimates of 3 divisions and 350,000 troops had been superseded by the mid-July estimate of 13 divisions and 990,000 troops plus activated civilian defense forces (poorly equipped but present). None of the historical critique of Truman’s post war claims about potential allied deaths accounts for the known July estimate of troop strength on Kyushu.

Ultra traffic also was able to determine that on Kyushu, the Japanese were altering strategy.  They would, in part, meet the landings at the water’s edge so that naval shore bombardment could not be used because of close quarters combat. As the allies landed, they planned to unleash kamikaze attacks on the beachhead – all to inflict horrific first day casualties, deplete amphibious assets to land additional troops, deplete troop carriers, and wreak general mayhem. They would also have a defense in depth in prepared positions ala Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Amphibious warfare (and land warfare in general) wants to begin the battle with superior strength. As Napoleon commented, “God favors the larger battalions.”  Commanders prefer a 5:1 ratio of superiority but 3:1 was considered the minimum. Kyushu was shaping up to be a 1:1 landing – a recipe for disaster.

This was just Southern Kyushu and did not include Northern Kyushu or Operation Coronet on the home island of Honshu.

---

Without the atomic bomb the choices were: invasion or blockade/bombing.