Overview

This is a somewhat longish post with details that may be of interest to a smaller group. Perhaps an “executive summary” would be helpful:

• Chinese shipyards generally build both civilian-use and military-use vessels – and often civilian vessels meet military specifications, e.g., ferries – allowing their easy incorporation into fleet use.
• China’s first interest is the South China Sea (SCS) and this is reflected in their “order of battle” in that combat ships are modern but the vessels needed for logistic support for a “blue water” navy are not part of the order.
• With their mainland based airfields, combatants, and fortified SCS islands and shoals, their “inland sea” is saturated with communications, detection and offensive strike ability – against indicating their interest is SCS operations vs. “blue water” operations. That being said, their combatants are more than capable of operating in the open ocean.
• Their submarine fleet is largely non-nuclear which is not as much a liability in SCS operations. They are advancing their nuclear fleet of submarines, well equipped with vertical launch systems.
• Over the last 10 years, the Chinese amphibious strike capability – undoubtedly aimed at Taiwan – has grown sophisticated and has been well exercised with a December 2025 excise encircling Taiwan to demonstrate they are capable of “strict quarantine” (blockade by any other name) or amphibious landings.

Shipbuilding: Military-Civil Fusion

China has developed the world’s largest and most integrated shipbuilding industry, deliberately structuring it so that commercial and military production reinforce one another. Major state-owned conglomerates such as China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) oversee vast networks of shipyards capable of producing everything from container ships and liquefied natural gas carriers to destroyers, aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, and coast guard vessels. Unlike many Western countries, where commercial and naval shipbuilding are largely separated, China’s shipyards often operate dual-use production lines, employ common suppliers, and maintain workforces and infrastructure that can be shifted between civilian and military contracts. This arrangement gives Beijing enormous surge capacity in wartime while allowing peacetime commercial exports to subsidize and sustain industrial capabilities critical to the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).

A central feature of this strategy is China’s “military-civil fusion” policy, under which commercial ship designs are increasingly required to incorporate specifications that could support military mobilization. Particular attention has been given to large roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) ferries, vehicle carriers, and heavy-lift merchant vessels that could rapidly transport troops, armored vehicles, and logistics supplies during an amphibious operation, especially in a Taiwan contingency. Chinese shipyards have produced dozens of large Ro-Ro ferries with strengthened vehicle decks, helicopter landing capability, reinforced ramps, and compatibility with military loading requirements. Vessels operated by commercial firms routinely participate in annual PLA amphibious exercises, demonstrating how civilian shipping assets could augment dedicated naval amphibious lift.

China is also the dominant force in global commercial shipbuilding, accounting in recent years for roughly half of worldwide merchant ship output by tonnage. This dominance provides strategic advantages beyond economics. Massive commercial production sustains steel fabrication, marine engine manufacturing, electronics integration, port infrastructure, and skilled labor pools that are directly relevant to naval expansion. As already mentioned,  many categories of Chinese-built commercial vessels possess latent military utility, including ferries, container ships, offshore support vessels, dredgers, and logistics carriers. While only a minority are explicitly designed for military conversion, the overall scale of China’s merchant fleet and shipyard output gives Beijing access to a reserve maritime transport capacity unmatched by most other nations.

The dual-use character of Chinese shipbuilding has become a growing concern for the United States and its allies because it blurs the traditional distinction between civilian and military maritime power. In a prolonged crisis, China could leverage its enormous commercial maritime base not only to sustain trade and logistics, but also to support sealift, repair, replenishment, and amphibious operations. This integration of civilian industry with naval strategy reflects a broader Chinese view that economic infrastructure, transportation networks, and industrial capacity are all components of comprehensive national power.

Blue-Water Combatants, Maritime Enforcement Vessels, and Amphibious Support Forces

The naval modernization of the People’s Republic of China over the past two decades has transformed the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) from a largely coastal defense force into one of the world’s most powerful maritime services. Today, the PLAN fields a rapidly expanding fleet of advanced surface combatants, a massive maritime enforcement structure, and increasingly capable amphibious support forces designed to sustain operations far from the Chinese mainland. China’s naval buildup reflects both its economic rise and its strategic ambition to become the dominant maritime power in the western Pacific and a global naval presence by mid-century.

A key aspect of the PLAN’s evolution has been the development of a modern “blue-water” navy capable of operating across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Blue-water combatants include aircraft carriers, guided missile destroyers, cruisers, frigates, nuclear submarines, and replenishment ships capable of sustained long-range operations. The PLAN now possesses the world’s largest navy by number of hulls, with estimates placing the fleet at approximately 370 battle-force ships and submarines.

Aircraft Carriers. Among the most visible symbols of China’s naval rise are its aircraft carriers. China currently operates three carriers: the Liaoning, the Shandong, and the newer Fujian. The first two employ ski-jump launch systems similar to earlier Soviet carrier designs, while the Fujian represents a major technological leap with electromagnetic catapult launch capability comparable to modern American carriers. Although Chinese naval aviation experience remains less mature than that of the United States Navy, the PLAN has demonstrated increasing proficiency in carrier flight operations and task-group coordination. These carriers provide China with expanding regional power-projection capability and support Beijing’s strategic objectives in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and western Pacific.

Large Destroyers. China’s destroyer force has also expanded dramatically. Of particular importance is the Type 055 Renhai-class guided missile destroyer, often regarded by Western analysts as functionally equivalent to a cruiser because of its size and firepower. The Type 055 destroyer carries 112 vertical launch system (VLS) cells. By way of comparison, the U.S. Arleigh Burke-class destroyer (Flight IIA) typically has 96 cells while the Ticonderoga-class cruiser has 122 cells.

In March 2026, China officially confirmed the commissioning of its ninth and tenth Type 055 vessels, bringing the total operational fleet to ten ships. These ships displace approximately 12,000 to 13,000 tons and carry advanced radar systems, long-range surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, and anti-submarine warfare systems. The Type 055 provides escort capability for aircraft carriers while also serving as a major strike platform in its own right.

Small Destroyers and Frigates. Supporting the Type 055s are large numbers of Type 052D destroyers. One of the defining features of the Type 052D is its 64-cell universal vertical launch system (VLS) with a mix of long-range surface-to-air missiles,  anti-ship cruise missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, anti-submarine rocket torpedoes, and other missile types. This gives the ship substantial flexibility in fleet operations. The Type 052D serves several key functions: escorting aircraft carriers, defending fleets from aircraft and missiles, striking enemy ships, supporting amphibious operations, and demonstrating Chinese blue-water naval reach.  There are also modern frigates such as the Type 054A class with its 32-cell vertical launch system (VLS). The Type 054A is especially important because of its ASW mission. All of the above support advanced helicopter operations especially for ASW operations.

China’s destroyer and frigate construction rate has significantly exceeded that of most other navies. 

Maritime Enforcement. In addition to combat warships, China has built a substantial maritime enforcement fleet centered on the China Coast Guard (CCG) and supported by the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). These forces play a central role in China’s “gray-zone” strategy, which seeks to assert Chinese territorial claims without triggering outright military conflict. The CCG has become the world’s largest coast guard force and operates heavily armed cutters capable of intimidating neighboring states in disputed waters such as the South China Sea and around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

Many Chinese coast guard vessels are larger than the naval combatants of neighboring countries. Some are converted former PLAN warships, while newer purpose-built cutters incorporate reinforced hulls, helicopter facilities, water cannons, and in some cases weapons systems approaching naval capability, e.g 30mm automatic cannons and 76mm naval guns. There are standard cutters and larger vessels (Zhaotou-class) that carry even larger weapons and tactical support. One of the capabilities not to be underestimated are the water canons. 

Chinese Coast Guard ships frequently use water cannons against Philippine resupply vessels, fishing boats, and other foreign craft. These systems can damage equipment, injure crews, disable navigation gear, and force vessels off course. Because they are considered “non-lethal,” they allow coercion below the threshold of formal armed conflict.

The China Coast Guard operates under the People’s Armed Police and ultimately under the command authority of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission, blurring distinctions between civilian law enforcement and military operations.

China also relies heavily on the maritime militia, a loosely organized fleet of fishing vessels and commercial ships that can support surveillance, logistics, and coercive maritime operations. Maritime militia vessels frequently operate alongside coast guard ships in disputed waters, allowing China to maintain pressure on rival claimants while avoiding direct naval escalation. Analysts increasingly view these forces as an integral part of China’s layered maritime strategy. There is no standard vessel configuration but most analysts believe equipment includes small arms, machine guns, signal equipment, reinforced hulls for ramming, water cannons, military communications gear, and surveillance electronics.

Militia vessels also support maritime reconnaissance, electronic observation, and intelligence gathering. Because they operate continuously in disputed areas, they can track foreign ship movements, monitor fishing activity, and relay information to Chinese authorities. They are many in number and are an example of military-civilian-use fusion.

Amphibious Capability

The PLAN’s amphibious warfare capability has expanded rapidly as well, reflecting China’s growing focus on potential operations involving Taiwan and regional expeditionary missions. Amphibious operations require specialized assault ships, transport docks, landing ships, logistics vessels, and civilian support shipping capable of transporting troops, vehicles, helicopters, and supplies across contested waters.

China’s most important amphibious assault vessels are the Type 075 landing helicopter docks (LHDs). These ships resemble smaller versions of American amphibious assault ships and can carry helicopters, amphibious vehicles, marines, and landing craft. By 2026, China had reportedly fielded eight Type 075 vessels, with additional units planned. The PLAN is also developing the newer Type 076 class, which is expected to incorporate unmanned aerial systems and more advanced aviation capabilities.

Supporting the Type 075s are numerous Type 071 amphibious transport docks (LPDs), traditional tank landing ships, and extensive civilian roll-on/roll-off ferry assets. China’s civilian shipping industry plays a particularly important role in amphibious planning. Under China’s military-civil fusion strategy, commercial ferries and transport ships are designed or modified to support military sealift operations. Large commercial ferries have participated in military exercises simulating troop and equipment transport across the Taiwan Strait.

The integration of civilian and military shipping gives China an enormous logistical advantage in any potential large-scale amphibious campaign. While the PLAN may still face serious challenges in conducting a full-scale invasion of Taiwan—particularly under hostile combat conditions—the scale of Chinese amphibious lift capacity has increased substantially compared to even a decade ago. According to analyses by the China Maritime Studies Institute and other defense organizations, China continues to expand specialized amphibious brigades, landing platforms, and joint logistics capabilities designed for cross-strait operations.

Despite these advances, important limitations remain. China still lacks the operational combat experience possessed by the United States Navy and some allied navies. Carrier aviation operations, large-scale amphibious warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and complex multinational coordination remain areas where the PLAN continues to develop proficiency. Moreover, sustaining naval operations over very long distances remains more difficult for China than for the United States, which maintains a global network of overseas bases and alliances.

Nevertheless, the overall trajectory of Chinese naval power is unmistakable. China has constructed a highly modern fleet of blue-water combatants, built the world’s largest maritime enforcement apparatus, and developed increasingly capable amphibious support forces that together support Beijing’s regional ambitions and global aspirations. The PLAN is no longer merely a coastal defense navy; it is becoming a comprehensive maritime force capable of contesting control of the western Pacific and projecting influence well beyond East Asia. The continued expansion of China’s naval capabilities will remain one of the defining strategic developments of the twenty-first century.

China’s interests in the South China Sea are profoundly commercial and economic, not merely military or nationalist. The sea functions as one of the central arteries of China’s economy and global position. Beijing views control, influence, or at least secure access to the region as vital to national survival and long-term development.

The South China Sea as a Strategic Economic Corridor. Roughly one-third of global maritime trade passes through the South China Sea (SCS), including enormous volumes of container shipping, energy imports, bulk commodities, and manufactured exports. For China specifically, the sea links China’s industrial east coast, Southeast Asian markets, the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, Europe, Africa and the United States. Chinese ports such as Port of Shanghai, Port of Shenzhen, and Port of Guangzhou depend heavily on uninterrupted maritime access through these waters. A disruption in the SCS could severely affect the exports of Chinese manufactured goods, imports of raw materials, and China’s supply chains.

Maritime trade in the South China Sea can be described by any number of measures. Its importance can be measured in a variety of ways: total trade value, shipping volume, energy flows, container traffic, and its role in global supply chains. The most widely cited estimate is that roughly $3–5 trillion in global trade passes through the SCS annually. That represents approximately 25% of global marine trade. Roughly one-third of global maritime crude oil trade passes through these waters. East Asia is the manufacturing center of the global economy and the SCS is central to containerized trade. Major shipping companies route vessels through the SCS because it is the shortest and most efficient path from manufacturing centers to delivery ports abroad. 

China’s economy is particularly dependent on these routes because China is the world’s largest exporter, it imports massive energy supplies, and much of its coastal industrial economy faces the South China Sea. Chinese strategic planners worry about blockade risks, foreign naval control, and vulnerability at maritime chokepoints – especially the Malacca Straits, the southwest entrance to the South China Sea.

Energy Security: Oil and LNG Imports. One of China’s greatest vulnerabilities is energy dependence. China imports massive amounts of crude oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and other energy products from the Persian Gulf, Africa, and elsewhere in the Indian Ocean region. Much of this energy passes through the Strait of Malacca, then across the South China Sea, and onward to Chinese ports. Chinese strategists often refer to this vulnerability as the “Malacca Dilemma,” the fear that in a crisis, especially involving the United States, these sea lanes could be interdicted or blockaded. This concern drives several Chinese policies including naval modernization, artificial island construction, maritime patrol expansion, diversification of pipelines, and the Belt and Road Initiative.

Oil and Gas Resources Within the South China Sea. The South China Sea itself is believed to contain significant oil reserves, very large natural gas reserves, and rich seabed resources. Estimates vary widely because much of the region remains underexplored, but China sees these potential reserves as strategically important. China’s state energy firms, including China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), have pursued offshore drilling, seismic surveys, and joint development proposals. Disputes emerge because Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei also claim many of the same waters and offshore blocks.

Fisheries and Food Security

The South China Sea contains some of the world’s richest fishing grounds. Fish are commercially important to China because seafood demand is enormous, coastal populations have long depended on fishing, and food security remains a strategic concern. Chinese fishing fleets operate extensively in disputed waters. Fishing vessels also serve secondary purposes: reinforcing Chinese presence, supporting maritime claims, and sometimes operating alongside the Chinese maritime militia.

Precise estimates of annual fish extraction are difficult because the SCS is heavily overfished, illegal and unreported fishing is widespread, and countries often underreport or distort catch data. Some estimates suggest over half the world’s fishing vessels operate in the broader South China Sea region. But the best academic and fisheries reconstructions provide reasonably credible estimates.  Most estimates center on 10 million metric tons per year of fish caught in the SCS. China is estimated to take 35-50% of the total catch which is not surprising since China possesses (by far) the world’s largest fishing fleet, including coastal fleets, distant-water fleets, and maritime militia-associated vessels. 

China is the world’s largest seafood consumer and growing middle-class demand has intensified fishing pressure. It must also be remembered that fishing activity is not only economic, but reinforces maritime claims, presence around disputed reefs, and gray-zone operations. As such, the Chinese fishing fleet is highly subsidized because of its importance to China’s economy. 

Fish are not a marginal issue in the SCS dispute. For China, fisheries involve food security, employment, maritime sovereignty claims, and regional influence. Some analysts argue that fisheries are one of the most immediate drivers of day-to-day confrontation in disputed waters – more so than oil. This is because studies indicate fish stocks in the SCS have declined by 70–95% since the 1950s, catch rates have fallen dramatically, and fleets increasingly catch smaller and younger fish lower on the food chain. China and bordering nations, all of which historically and culturally have fish as a major source of dietary protein, are chasing an increasingly diminishing commodity.

China has been aggressively intruding into waters and maritime zones that the Philippines claims under international law, particularly within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the SCS. Much of the friction occurs in waters west of the Philippine island of Palawan, especially around Second Thomas Shoal, Scarborough Shoal, Mischief Reef and Reed Bank. These areas fall within 200 nautical miles of the Philippines and are therefore claimed by Manila as part of its EEZ under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Philippine fishermen have repeatedly reported being blocked from traditional fishing grounds, harassment by Chinese coast guard vessels (which are armed with 5-inch guns and automatic weapons), water cannon incidents, confiscation of catches, and dangerous maneuvering at sea. China coast guard and maritime militia vessels are constructed with reinforced bows capable of – not full on ramming – but shall we say quite aggressive nudging.

Maritime militia vessels disguised as fishing boats and PLA Coast Guard vessels are used to assert Chinese claims, maintain constant presence, pressure rival claimants, while avoiding overt naval warfare. The Philippines and its allies characterize many of these tactics as “gray-zone coercion,” aggressive pressure below the threshold of armed conflict.

Trade With Southeast Asia. The South China Sea is also the maritime bridge connecting China to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) economies. ASEAN is one of China’s largest trading partners accounting for 20% of trade with China. Goods moving through the region include electronics, machinery, semiconductors, consumer goods, agricultural commodities, and industrial inputs. Any instability in these waters threatens Chinese exports, regional manufacturing networks, and supply-chain integration.

Undersea Infrastructure and Communications. Less visible but increasingly important are submarine communication cables, offshore infrastructure, and digital trade routes. The South China Sea contains major undersea fiber-optic cable systems connecting East Asia to the broader world economy. Control or monitoring of maritime zones can therefore have implications beyond shipping to include telecommunications, internet traffic, financial systems, and digital commerce.

The SCS marine floor has the highest concentration of marine fiber optic cables. These cables carry financial transactions, cloud computing traffic, military communications, commercial internet traffic, and industrial data. For China, they support export industries, global manufacturing networks, e-commerce, artificial intelligence infrastructure, and digital connectivity under the Belt and Road Initiative.  The SCS infrastructure forms the hub that connects China and East Asia with Singapore, India, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. It is part of China’s “Digital Silk Road” initiative.

The geography of the SCS makes it difficult to avoid. Nearly all East Asian digital traffic heading westward toward Europe or the Indian Ocean passes through cables in these waters. This creates both opportunity and vulnerability for China. Chinese strategists worry about cable sabotage, surveillance, bottlenecks, and wartime disruption. As a result, China has pursued redundant cable routes, alternate land corridors, and Arctic communications concepts, yet 95% of China’s extra-territorial communication still passes through these cables.

Strategic Economic Buffering. China’s island-building campaign has economic as well as military dimensions. Artificial islands allow China to support coast guard and maritime enforcement activity, monitor shipping, sustain fishing fleets, protect energy exploration, and reinforce administrative control over contested waters. Beijing argues these activities secure lawful commercial interests; critics view them as coercive attempts to dominate international waters.

The Broader Chinese Perspective. From Beijing’s viewpoint, the South China Sea is not a distant frontier. It is viewed as 

• a near-seas defensive zone,
• an economic and food security lifeline,
• an energy transit corridor,
• and a gateway to China’s continued rise as a global power.

Many Chinese strategists believe that if hostile powers controlled these waters, China’s economy, trade, energy supply, and geopolitical autonomy could all be placed at risk. That perception helps explain why the South China Sea occupies such a central place in Chinese national strategy even beyond the military dimension.

The Nine-Dash Line

The “Nine-Dash Line” is a map boundary used by the People’s Republic of China to claim large portions of the South China Sea. It is not directly a sovereignty claim over Taiwan, but it is closely connected to the broader China–Taiwan issue because both the government in People’s Republic of China (Beijing/PRC) and the government in Taiwan (the Republic of China, or ROC) historically inherited versions of the same maritime claims from pre-1949 China. But they are not the only countries with claims in the South China Sea. Claimants include Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei and the Philippines.

The line originated with the Republic of China government in 1947 as an “Eleven-Dash Line.” After the Chinese Civil War, the communist government in Beijing adopted and modified it into the current Nine-Dash Line. Taiwan’s ROC government still officially maintains a similar claim, though Taipei today emphasizes stability and practical administration more than expansive maritime nationalism. It is interesting to note that Beijing sometimes argues that Taiwan’s continued adherence to similar maritime claims supports the idea that both sides belong to “one China.”

The Nine-Dash Line matters because the South China Sea contains major international shipping lanes, commercial fishing grounds, potential oil and gas reserves and militarily is a key strategic location. PRC/China has used the claim to justify building shoals into artificial islands, establishing military facilities there and on naturally existing islands, as well as conducting aggressive coast guard and naval patrols. Reports and videos of aggressive  maritime engagements routinely appear online, in the news, and in maritime industry journals.

The Nine-Dash Line, in a way, is tangential to the China-Taiwan dispute. The Nine-Dash Line is primarily a South China Sea territorial claim, not a direct claim about Taiwan itself. However, it is important as Taiwan controls Taiping Island (Itu Aba), the largest naturally occurring island in the Spratly chain – and some 1,000 miles south-southwest of Taiwan. This gives Taiwan a direct physical role in South China Sea disputes. Taiwan also sits near the northern gateway to the South China Sea from the East China Sea and along critical naval routes connecting the Pacific Ocean to Chinese coastal waters. 

But the nations most impacted by aggressive PRC maritime patrols and attempts at enforcement are the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia. The South China Sea is important to these nations for the same reasons it is economically important to China.

Claims and Assertions

The origin of the “Nine-Dash Line” is rooted in a mixture of historical memory, nationalism, geography, imperial legacy, and modern state-building. It was not created out of nowhere as a purely arbitrary assertion, but neither was it historically defined in the precise modern legal sense that China sometimes presents today.

Chinese dynastic records from the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing periods contain references to islands, shoals, navigation routes, and fishing grounds in what is now called the South China Sea. For centuries, Chinese fishermen, merchants, and sailors traveled through the South China Sea. Chinese fishermen from Hainan and Guangdong regularly traveled seasonally into the Paracel and Spratly regions. Chinese sources also describe maritime trade routes through the area. Imperial Chinese records, navigation charts, and local gazetteers mention these areas intermittently. China argues that these activities demonstrate discovery and naming of islands, longstanding fishing usage, patrols and survey expeditions, and administrative awareness of the region. There is also archaeological evidence of extensive Chinese commercial activity seen in shipwrecks, porcelain cargoes, copper coins, and evidence of the old Maritime Silk Road crossing the South China Sea.

But the South China Sea was never an exclusively Chinese maritime zone historically. Vietnamese, Malay, Filipino, and other Southeast Asian fishermen and traders also operated throughout the region for centuries and can make the same historical and archaeological claims. Even some Chinese legal scholars acknowledge the sea historically functioned as a shared maritime space used by many peoples.

What’s more, pre-modern Asian states generally did not define maritime sovereignty the way modern international law does. It was understood that “control” was fluid and shifting as seen in tribute systems, fishing access, trade routes, or occasional patrols rather than fixed maritime borders. So there was a historical Chinese presence and awareness in the region, but not continuous modern-style administrative control over the entire sea. The same can be said about several other nations.

This is important because under modern international law, merely having fishermen or traders present does not automatically create sovereignty over enormous maritime areas.

The Modern Era

The 1947 assertion by the Republic of China government under the Kuomintang (still before the takeover by the Communist Chinese) reflected several motivations. It was reclaiming territory after Japanese occupation, asserting China’s status as a restored great power, resisting perceived Western and Japanese encroachment, and strengthening national unity after decades of invasion and civil war. When the communists won the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the government in Beijing took up the mantle of maritime claims.

For many Chinese people both in mainland China and Taiwan, the South China Sea claims became emotionally tied to the broader narrative of overcoming the “Century of Humiliation.” That narrative includes the Opium Wars, the Unequal Treaties that resulted from those wars, the resulting colonial concessions, the Japanese invasion, and the loss of sense from the foreign domination that was in place from the 19th to mid-20th centuries. In this mindset, recovering lost territories became symbolic of restoring national dignity and sovereignty. Many Chinese see the South China Sea claims not as expansionism, but as reversing historical injustice. But the counter-claimants in the region are not nations or peoples involved in any historical injustices against China.  The controversy is that historical usage, shifting periods of colonial dominance, and other factors are not automatically factors in modern legal sovereignty under international law. 

In 2016, an international tribunal in The Hague ruled in a case brought by the Philippines that China’s sweeping Nine-Dash Line claims had no legal basis under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Beijing rejected the ruling. Taiwan also rejected parts of the decision because it affected claims tied to Taiping Island.

South China Claims and Economic Zone Disputes