Lots of writing and research. The previous post outlined the moral landscape I want to explore, but I also have an additional objective. As we approach the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II with the unconditional surrender of the nation of Japan and as the last of our WWII veterans pass from this life, I hope this series can remind or teach readers about the long-ago events that still shape modern life.
While this series assumes that atomic weapons were not available for the prosecution of the end of the war in the Pacific, the discussion around the topic and critique of the use of the first atomic bomb offers areas worth considering. Some of those arguments for not using atomic weapons were: Japan knew they were defeated and were ready for peace, naval blockade would have been sufficient, the demand for unconditional surrender was unnecessary, worries about post-WWII communism were premature, estimates of allied invasion-related deaths were inflated, and several other arguments. They are ideas worth exploring in this series.
To that end, the series of posts will walk through the history and lay a groundwork for the events leading to August 1945 in the Pacific, key events in the war which shaped the strategy and tactics of the final phases of the war, as well as an understanding of the internal politics and diplomatic posture of the Japanese leadership. I am not a trained historian, my sources are available as open sources, and as I write this post I am not even to the end of my research. I no doubt will make mistakes, misunderstand sources, miss key elements, but along the way I will give my best effort and from time-to-time may even write something that is unknown to you.
At the moment here is a (hoped for) schedule of upcoming posts:
- The Rise of Militarism in pre-WW II Japan
- Japanese Colonial Ambitions
- War Plan Orange
- War in the Pacific – the early months
- Unrestricted Submarine Warfare in the Pacific
- Civilian Death
- Saipan: Civilians in Combat
- Battles that Changed War Strategy for Japan
These posts will let us reach September 1944 and so there will be a bunch more after these…. All works in progress. The focus of the remaining posts are not a recounting of the war in the Pacific, but will begin to highlight critical elements that began to shape the strategy and tactics of ending the war – for both the Allied and Imperial Japan.
…and no doubt even what I have in mind will evolve and change. There is a proven military axiom: all battle plans evaporate upon first contact with the enemy. In a similar vein, all lists of scheduled posts evaporate upon continued contact with research.
Image credit: various photographs from Naval Aviation Museum, National World War II Museum, and US Navy Archives.
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friarmusings 
Thank you Fr. George. I look forward to this series. My dad was a Marine who served on Guadalcanal, Okinawa, and several places in between. While I’m not ‘school trained’, I am the historian for a couple of organizations. History, my all time favorite subject.
FDR Caused war by blockading JAPAN ~~ who had no oil and would Slowly die if not broken ?????????
WAs FDR committing and ACT of WAR ??????????
Why did FDR do this ??????????
One of the canards about WWII in the Pacific is that Roosevelt initiated/caused the war. It does not align with the historical record.
Japan had already signaled its intent for aggression in East Asia. In 1936 Japan withdrew from the Washington Naval Treaty. From this point military spending surged resulting in the aggressive expansion of the Navy, naval air forces and the army. Japan had already invaded Manchuria (1931) and China (1937). In 1940, Japan joined the Axis powers of Germany and Italy. In 1941, it occupied French Indochina, threatening British Malaya and Dutch East Indies—key sources of oil and rubber. This was all before any oil embargo.
In July 1941, following Japan’s invasion of southern Indochina, the United States—along with Britain and the Netherlands—stopped oil sales to Japan. This was a strategic response to Japan’s aggression in China and Southeast Asia. The U.S. and allies hoped the embargo would deter further Japanese aggression or bring them to the negotiating table. Japan instead chose to attack Pearl Harbor in December 1941, aiming to cripple the U.S. Pacific Fleet and secure access to the oil-rich Dutch East Indies. They felt they had to either yield to U.S. demands (withdraw from China) or secure resources by force. They chose war, gambling that the U.S. would not fight a prolonged Pacific conflict. As will be presented in a post next week, Japan’s actions were aligned and consistent with Kantai Kessen, its war plan for the Pacific first developed in the 1910s, refined in the 1920s, and matured in “War Plan G” in the mid-1930s.
Japan’s aggressive imperial expansion, not the allied embargo, was the root cause of the war. The embargo was a strategic response, not a provocation for war. The responsibility for choosing war lay with the Japanese government, particularly the military leadership, which rejected diplomatic solutions in favor of expansionism.