In the previous post we considered the basis of modern just war theory in the writings and reflections of St. Thomas Aquinas. His thoughts became the basis for reflection on wars prior to the 20th century. For example, in the 16th century the Dominican Francisco de Vitoria applied just war thinking to Spain’s wars of conquest in the Americas. While he rejected armed conflict against indigenous people for the cause of conversion, he argued that the Spanish explorers had freedom to be in the foreign lands and their defense was just.  Thomas’ thoughts were applied to conflicts between Christian monarchs, regional disputes, and the such. It was not until the 17th century that Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, used the theory and applied just war reasoning to the Thirty Years’ War and European state conflicts. His work was foundational in international law and guided legal-political thinking for centuries. It also reflected the changing nature of war in the western European world.

In a very different setting, during the Crusades of the 11th–13th centuries, medieval theologians and canonists defended the Crusades as just wars under Aquinas’ principles. Their understanding was that the wars met the criteria: legitimate authority in the Pope; a just cause in defense of pilgrims and recovery of holy places;  and the right intention, namely service to God. It was not until the late 16th century in the work of Francisco Suárez that “proportionality” was considered.

In May 1945, Germany surrendered unconditionally. Many commentators offer that this would have been the optimal time to organize discussions with the Allies about a negotiated peace, preempt Russian involvement in the Pacific War, and end the war on terms acceptable to Japan. No attempts were made – nor were they likely to have gotten “off the ground.” The mindset of the Council was devotion to the Ketsu-Go plan. Suzuki had zero possibility of reaching a unanimous Council position in order to present such an option to the Emperor.

Meanwhile, during this time period, Leyte has fallen, Luzon is all-but-defeated, Iwo Jima has been taken, and  Okinawa is in progress. Allied bombing and firebombing continues. The submarine blockade is tightening its hold. The last oil tanker reached Japan in March 1945. Japan had their oil, gas and aviation fuel reserves and no hope to replenish their stock – which was more than 1 million barrels.  At the same time B-29 sealane mining is grinding coastal sea traffic to a halt, naval shore bombardment continues and there is no decisive battle left save Okinawa (doubtful) or Ketsu-Go, the defense of the home islands.

In this time period Emperor Hirohito had asked for two reports: (a) Estimate of the World Situation (prepared by the Army staff) and (b) Sōri Daijin Hōkoku – “Report to the Prime Minister” (prepared by Admiral Sakomizu). Sakomizu was asked to produce an objective, comprehensive assessment of Japan’s military, economic, and social condition to guide decisions about continuing or ending the war. The report painted a grim and realistic picture.