A great deal of the discussion about Just War theory focuses on the state and national polities especially before the war and in the context of the decision to declare war: jus en bellum. The focus is the justice of the cause. What is often overlooked, or at least not often spoken of, is the moral and spiritual burden borne by the warfighter.  Already in the Summa Theologiae (II–II, q.40), Aquinas notes that the individual soldier’s actions must be ordered toward right intention — not hatred, cruelty, or greed. That is not only to avoid sin, but also a recognition of the impact of war is very different on the foot soldier than on the monarch. St. Thomas does not offer more on the topic, but then it was not the focus of his writings.

In cinematic offerings before, during, and after WW II, combat was depicted as heroic: soldiers carrying out their righteous duty to protect their country, complete their mission, and sometimes, take the lives of their enemies. But the cinematic lens of that era rarely focused on what happens after the gunfire stops, after the explosions cease, and after a soldier takes another human’s life. The notable exception is “The Best Years of Our Lives.” The film, which won an Academy Award for Best Picture, follows three servicemen as they re-adjust to civilian life, dealing with issues like unemployment, physical disability, and the emotional toll of war. Movies of this century have more offering of the time after combat ends, leaving behind a harsh and devastating reality: the psychological toll of combat, specifically for those who have taken a life. Moral injuries have been part of the warrior culture throughout human history. There is a perilous journey into war and a perilous journey back. It is a journey that is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous.

This is an addendum to the “Olympic Decision” post. It continues the thread of thought that suggests President Truman left the June 18, 1945 without a firm answer to expected losses – not to say he wasn’t briefed later. But it also addresses the historians who offer that post-war Truman inflated the estimated US losses associated with an invasion to “more than a million.”

In the earlier article it was posited that based on Japanese troop strength on Kyushu by the end of July and a casualty rate similar to Okinawa, there would be an estimated 792,000 allied casualties. By and large those are ground force casualties and do not account for shipboard naval losses. In Admiral Nimitz’s early May estimate, his planning staff projected massive losses due to kamikaze attacks: 25 aircraft carriers, 10 battleships, and 40 cruisers and destroyers. Japanese documents and testimony of naval leadership indicated that the Kyushu kamikaze efforts would be primarily aimed at troop transports and supply ships. The troop ships (Attack Transport-AP) varied in size but this will give you an idea of the capacity. 

This would be at three different beachheads.