This is an addendum to the “Olympic Decision” post. It continues the thread of thought that suggests President Truman left the June 18, 1945 without a firm answer to expected losses – not to say he wasn’t briefed later. But it also addresses the historians who offer that post-war Truman inflated the estimated US losses associated with an invasion to “more than a million.”

In the earlier article it was posited that based on Japanese troop strength on Kyushu by the end of July and a casualty rate similar to Okinawa, there would be an estimated 792,000 allied casualties. By and large those are ground force casualties and do not account for shipboard naval losses. In Admiral Nimitz’s early May estimate, his planning staff projected massive losses due to kamikaze attacks: 25 aircraft carriers, 10 battleships, and 40 cruisers and destroyers. Japanese documents and testimony of naval leadership indicated that the Kyushu kamikaze efforts would be primarily aimed at troop transports and supply ships. The troop ships (Attack Transport-AP) varied in size but this will give you an idea of the capacity. 

This would be at three different beachheads.

The previous post ended with this: “The question of interest is jus bello (in war), especially as it concerns the ways and means to end the Asia Pacific War. In the language of Just War Theory – were the ways and means “proportional” and was adequate care given to the question of non-combatant injury and death.? In preparing to write on this topic I am not sure how to best describe the reading and research.  The following expressions come to mind: “down the rabbit hole,” “swamp,” and “forget the forest, I am still looking for trees.” Whereas the conditions for establishing jus ad bellum are consistent and have been clearly expressed, not so much for jus bello. It is an understatement to say there are “different schools of  thought.” The debate centers on two concepts: proportionality and necessity – that are intertwined.

One of the schools of thought are the “consequentialists.” Although I did not see a delineation of “schools with a school,” the literature certainly seemed to indicate a wide division in views of writers that would be counted as consequentialists. For the sake of brevity, I would label them the “wide” and “narrow” schools of thought and would provide an example of each (with apologies to just war theorists and their work.)

After the May 1945 German surrender, arrangements were made for the Allies to meet in Potsdam, Germany. The topics were to settle the postwar arrangements for Europe and to reach agreement on coordinated Allied military operations against Japan. A month before the mid-July Potsdam Conference, President Truman met with his senior advisers to go over plans for ending the war with Japan and to prepare himself for Potsdam. In a 14 June memorandum to the service chiefs setting up this meeting, his Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy, said the President wanted to:

“. . . discuss details of our campaign against Japan. He expects at this meeting to be thoroughly informed of our intentions and prospects in preparation for his discussions with Churchill and Stalin. He wants an estimate of the time required and an estimate of the losses in killed and wounded that will result from an invasion of Japan proper. He wants an estimate of the time and the losses that will result from an effort to defeat Japan by isolation, blockade, and bombardment by sea and air forces. It is his intention to make his decision on the campaign with the purpose of economizing to the maximum extent possible in the loss of American lives. Economy in the use of time and money cost is comparatively unimportant. I suggest that a memorandum discussion of the above noted points be prepared in advance for delivery to the President at the time of the meeting. . . .”

In the previous post we considered the basis of modern just war theory in the writings and reflections of St. Thomas Aquinas. His thoughts became the basis for reflection on wars prior to the 20th century. For example, in the 16th century the Dominican Francisco de Vitoria applied just war thinking to Spain’s wars of conquest in the Americas. While he rejected armed conflict against indigenous people for the cause of conversion, he argued that the Spanish explorers had freedom to be in the foreign lands and their defense was just.  Thomas’ thoughts were applied to conflicts between Christian monarchs, regional disputes, and the such. It was not until the 17th century that Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, used the theory and applied just war reasoning to the Thirty Years’ War and European state conflicts. His work was foundational in international law and guided legal-political thinking for centuries. It also reflected the changing nature of war in the western European world.

In a very different setting, during the Crusades of the 11th–13th centuries, medieval theologians and canonists defended the Crusades as just wars under Aquinas’ principles. Their understanding was that the wars met the criteria: legitimate authority in the Pope; a just cause in defense of pilgrims and recovery of holy places;  and the right intention, namely service to God. It was not until the late 16th century in the work of Francisco Suárez that “proportionality” was considered.

In May 1945, Germany surrendered unconditionally. Many commentators offer that this would have been the optimal time to organize discussions with the Allies about a negotiated peace, preempt Russian involvement in the Pacific War, and end the war on terms acceptable to Japan. No attempts were made – nor were they likely to have gotten “off the ground.” The mindset of the Council was devotion to the Ketsu-Go plan. Suzuki had zero possibility of reaching a unanimous Council position in order to present such an option to the Emperor.

Meanwhile, during this time period, Leyte has fallen, Luzon is all-but-defeated, Iwo Jima has been taken, and  Okinawa is in progress. Allied bombing and firebombing continues. The submarine blockade is tightening its hold. The last oil tanker reached Japan in March 1945. Japan had their oil, gas and aviation fuel reserves and no hope to replenish their stock – which was more than 1 million barrels.  At the same time B-29 sealane mining is grinding coastal sea traffic to a halt, naval shore bombardment continues and there is no decisive battle left save Okinawa (doubtful) or Ketsu-Go, the defense of the home islands.

In this time period Emperor Hirohito had asked for two reports: (a) Estimate of the World Situation (prepared by the Army staff) and (b) Sōri Daijin Hōkoku – “Report to the Prime Minister” (prepared by Admiral Sakomizu). Sakomizu was asked to produce an objective, comprehensive assessment of Japan’s military, economic, and social condition to guide decisions about continuing or ending the war. The report painted a grim and realistic picture.