It is time to introduce the key figures “behind the curtain” of the United States. Apart from the human and political intrigue native to any human enterprise, the chain of command was clear. In wartime, the President of the United States was the “Commander in Chief.” He possessed the unilateral power to make decisions, was active in soliciting discussion, and most often took the advice of his military leaders. But it was clear that the “buck” stopped on the desk of the President.

The American operational leadership of the Asia-Pacific war effort was established and consistent from the inception of war to its conclusion in 1945. 

We jump ahead on the timeline for a moment to complete the Allied thought that began at the  Jan 1943 Casablanca Conference: terms of surrender for Germany and Japan. 2.5 years after Casablanca, after Nazi Germany had unconditionally surrendered, the Allies prosecuting the war in the Pacific met. On July 26, 1945, US President Harry S. Truman, UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and President of China Chiang Kai-shek issued a document, which outlined the terms of surrender for the Empire of Japan. The Potsdam Declaration (Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender) was a statement that called for the surrender of all Japanese armed forces. The ultimatum (and it was worded as an ultimatum) warned: “We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.” The ultimatum was clear: if Japan did not unconditionally surrender, it would face “prompt and utter destruction.” By this time in the war Japan was already devastated by bombing and only possessed defensive capability. The war was all but lost by any conventional standard. The Potsdam statement was released only 11 days before the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.

Who were the allied leaders whose decisions would be the most impactful on the Asia- Pacific War? And equally important what were key inter-allied conversations and decisions that would shape the manner and outcome of the war?  Unlike Japan that had no effective dialog or connection to its Axis partners, the Allied met quite regularly in high level conferences with its partners. Quite early in the war, the allies agreed that both the war in Europe and the Asia-Pacific would end in unconditional surrender.

At the January 1943 Casablanca Conference the Allies (U.S., Britain, USSR*) demanded, as pertains to Japan, that Japan surrender without preconditions, meaning:

• total disarmament,
• Allied occupation of the home islands,
• war crimes trials, and
• Reshaping of Japan’s government along democratic lines.

At no point did the policy mention the future of the Emperor, a central figure in Japan’s political and spiritual life.

This policy did not emerge from a vacuum but was rooted in and shaped by the experience of World War I, current knowledge of WWII axis war crimes, and concerns over postwar stability. 

The two previous posts were meant to give the reader a sense of the Emperor’s role in war-time governance in Japan. To be sure, I have not done the topic justice as just like “Washington insider” machinations (then and now) Japan had its own “system” to navigate to achieve decisions. Some of this was already covered. A review of two posts would be helpful: Ketsu-Go and Governance and Ketsu Go. The former describes Japanese plans for the “decisive battle” that would bring the Allies to a negotiation table and away from their demands for unconditional surrender. The latter describes the sequence of events that took Ketsu-Go from a strategic idea (January 45) to a formally approved plan of action (March 45) – and gave some sense of the internal factions within the government along with their agendas. In this post we look “behind the curtain.”

The previous posts have tried to show that Hirohito, as Emperor, moved from “self-induced neutrality” in decisions to a more animated Emperor in decisions about the war. He was briefed and was aware of war progress and failures. He asked critical questions. He knew of cases where the military subverted his expressed views. And he deftly navigated the reach and influence of his power while remaining the Emperor in a constitutional monarchy where the power lay with the military.

What is uncertain was the quality of information the Emperor was receiving. While there were cases in which military leaders hedged reports, these same leaders were at the mercy of field commander reports which often were greatly exaggerated. This was especially true among Imperial Army (IJA) ranks; less so from the Imperial Navy (IJN). It was hard to obfuscate the loss of aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers and more. A subtext of much of the reports, as the historian Edward Drea notes, was a dismissive view that “Americans [were] products of liberalism and individualism and incapable of fighting a protracted war.” This is what drove the Japanese to find the “Decisive Battle” to bring the Allies to a negotiation to end the war. Midway, Guadalcanal and especially Saipan were to be those battles. And yet the allies pressed forward with the war. The Emperor supported the drive to bring about the decisive battle – but as a necessary precursor to his end-game: a negotiated peace. Or perhaps a negotiated continuity of the Imperial Household.