1 He said to his disciples, “Things that cause sin will inevitably occur, but woe to the person through whom they occur. 2 It would be better for him if a millstone were put around his neck and he be thrown into the sea than for him to cause one of these little ones to sin. (Luke 17)
These two sayings are connected by the words skandala (v. 1) and skandalizo (v. 2). The original meaning of this word group skandal- was “trap;” or, more specifically a trap’s tripping mechanism. The word group is used to translate the Hebrew próskomma, meaningboth “trap”, “stumbling block” or, “cause of ruin.” In the latter sense, this transferred to the religious setting to mean “cause of sin.” But is “cause of sin” the best translation here? Paul says that “Christ crucified is a stumbling block (skándalon)to the Jews” (1 Cor 1:23) and also describes the cross as a stumbling block (skándalon) (Galatians 5:11). Consider three other modern gospel translations, all noted for faithful adherence to translation.
In May of 1942 the Japanese Empire covered 10 million square miles and extended from Manchuria, China and Korea eastward to the International Dateline and southward to the Philippines, Dutch East Indies, Java, Borneo, Sumatra and Malaya. The shape of the Empire was as though a lopsided, bottom heavy pear with Japan located at the top near the stem. As an island nation massively importing oil, rubber, iron, bauxite, aluminum, all manner of raw materials – and food – it was completely dependent on shipping to fuel the war machine, supply its armed forces, and feed the people on the home islands.
A blockade of Japan was, from the beginning of the war, a primary objective of the Allies. The island empire was surrounded by shallow, mineable water. Her crowded people depended on imports for 20 per cent of their food; nutritional standards were so low that a mere one-fifth reduction of imports meant privation for the population. Japan’s war effort and manufacturing potential depended on imports for 90 per cent of all oil, 88 per cent of all iron, 24 per cent of all coal. Over half of all domestic coal was waterborne between mine and factory. Even in-country domestic transport depended in large part on coastal craft transport because the geography of Japan made rail and road development problematic
On December 7, 1941 Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark authorized unrestricted submarine operations against all Japanese ships – combatant or merchant. An earlier post on the topic described the slowly building strangulation of merchant shipping over the course of the war. By 1945, Japan no longer had access to 90–95% of the oil/fuel it had been importing. There were similar impacts of the other raw materials imported from the southern reaches of the Empire. By 1945 the open ocean sea lanes from Borneo, Java, Indonesia, French Indochina (Vietnam) and all points in Southeast Asia were heavily patrolled by American, British and Dutch submarines. As described in the Big Blue Fleet post, the fast carrier fleet and land based allied aircraft were beginning to take a serious toll on Japanese shipping. The cumulative effect was a slow tightening of the blockade.
The submarine blockade had virtually stopped water-borne traffic to and from the huge east coast ports of Tokyo, Yokohama, and Nagoya but a vast amount of shipping still passed into the smaller west coast ports facing the Inland Sea (Sea of Japan) after passing through Shimonoseki Strait and the Bungo Suido. These were the only “safe” sea lanes: the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and the straits and inter-island passages within Japan. And even that was about to change.
Submarines already had been laying mines in the Sea of Japan and near west coast Japanese ports with some effect. The Sea of Japan was a dangerous operating area for allied submarines due to shallow water and lack of accurate charts. The Japanese still provided air patrols and combat coverage for shipping in the Sea of Japan and the Combined Fleet dedicated destroyers to merchant escort duty. Submarines could carry 24-40 sea mines, but that meant the submarines did not have torpedoes. Each patrol had to balance the torpedo/mine loadout. In late 1944 Admiral Nimitz requested that his naval operations be augmented by extensive mining of Japan’s “safe sea lanes” by the US Army Air Force (AAF) operating out of Tinian and Saipan.
Now that the B-29s had the ‘reach’ to cover the same area, they only needed the mission to drop mines in designated areas. They were far more capable of delivering large numbers of anti-shipping mines in short amounts of time. It took time for the AAF to agree to the mission and then to modify the B-29s for the mine dropping mission. Nimitz had hoped the operation could have commenced in January, as the attrition of enemy merchant shipping might have considerably reduced Japanese resistance by the time of the Okinawa assault.
The mining campaign of the safe sea lanes and non-East coast ports was initiated by the Tinian-based B-29s on 27 March 1945: Operation Starvation. The title was meant to convey the goal: starving Japan’s war machine of needed raw materials and oil, as well as starving people on the home islands who depended on the net import of rice and raw fish. Marine merchant traffic between Japan and the Asiatic mainland grew scarce. Manchurian imports dropped. Major General William F. Sharp, an American POW in Siberia, watched lines of loaded freight cars grow longer, waiting for Japanese ships which never came. The goods were available; the transport ships were not.
Factories which had survived continued strategic bombing raids operated at reduced levels or not at all. “It was not only the bombing of factories that defeated us,” said Takashi Komatsu of the Nippon Steel Tube Company, after the war was over, “it was the blockade which deprived us of essential raw materials— aluminum and coal.” Hisanobu Terai, president of NYK, Japan’s biggest shipping line, blamed food and raw materials shortages for the defeat and claimed that in the last months “proportions of shipping sunk were one by sub, six by bombs, twelve by mines.” The proportions were not technically correct, but the statement was indicative of the sense of the growing frustration and fear of the industrial sector of Japan’s war economy.
In addition to the havoc brought to bear on Japanese shipping, U. S. mines kept Japanese mine sweeping forces busy. At least 20,000 men and 349 ships attempted to keep sea lanes and harbors open during the blockade. Three out of every four minesweepers were lost. Speaking for all Japanese mine experts, Captain Kyuzo Tamura, Imperial Japanese Navy, told postwar interrogators, “The result of B-29 mining was so effective against the shipping that it eventually starved the country. I think you probably could have shortened the war by beginning earlier.”
Shipping losses continued, and seagoing traffic dwindled to a mere trickle. Merchants not sunk were in need of repair, but only 3 of the 22 principal merchant marine shipyards were open because access was closed due to sea mining. Damaged merchant ships were as good as sunk; there was no way to repair them.
Shortages of coal, oil, salt, and food were coming close to eliminating what Japanese industry survived the bombing raids. Japan’s leading industrialists could see the end coming. By mid-July they warned military leaders that if the war went on another year, as many as 7 million Japanese might die of starvation.
Mines sank or damaged over 670 ships, accounting for more than 1.25 million tons of shipping. Shipping through major areas like Kobe declined by 85% from March to July 1945
As an island nation dependent on outside sources of oil, raw materials, and foodstuffs, Japan was uniquely vulnerable to sea mine warfare. The AAF launched 1,529 sorties and laid 12,135 mines in 26 fields on 46 separate missions. A total of 670 ships were sunk or damaged, accounting for more than 1.25 million shipping tons.
Eventually most of the major ports and straits of Japan were repeatedly mined, severely disrupting Japanese logistics and troop movements for the remainder of the war with 35 of 47 essential convoy routes having to be abandoned. This operation sank more ship tonnage in the last six months of the war than the efforts of all other sources combined during the same period.
Image credit: various photographs from Naval Aviation Museum, National World War II Museum, and US Navy Archives.
This coming Sunday is the 27th Sunday in Year C with the Gospel taken from Luke 17:5-10. Throughout the previous chapter (Luke 16), Jesus has addressed the Pharisees and scribes (scholars of the law) with beginning and ending parables: the dishonest steward and the rich man and Lazarus – each begins with a statement, “There was a rich man.” The clear target were the lovers of money, i.e., those whose love of riches prevented them from truly being lovers of God. Although the parables are aimed at the Pharisees the lesson continues a theme from 12:1 “Beware of the leaven–that is, the hypocrisy–of the Pharisees.” The disciples are reminded of the characteristics of true discipleship as well as the pitfalls along the way.
In addition, looking ahead to Luke 17:11: “As Jesus continued his journey to Jerusalem…” it is clear that Luke will return to a travel motif to continue telling the narrative. It is as though v.11 marks a new subsection within the longer travel narrative (9:51-19:48). Joel Green holds that 17:1-10 marks the end of a lengthy question that began in 13:10, namely, “who will participate in the kingdom of God?” (Green, Luke, 611). If this is true, then clearly the two characteristics emphasized are faith and service.
Every so often it is good to “check in” with the Patriarchs of the early Church to see their reflections on the parable of the Rich Man and Poor Lazarus. Here is a sample of their thought
St. John Chrysostom (late 4th century AD) – often used this parable to warn that failing to aid the poor is itself a form of robbery. “Not to share our own wealth with the poor is theft from the poor and deprivation of their means of life; we do not possess our own wealth, but theirs.” (Homily on Lazarus and the Rich Man, 1) Chrysostom He stresses that the rich man’s sin was not that he had wealth, but that wealth without mercy leads to condemnation
St. Augustine (late 4th and early 5th century AD) focused on the end of the parable: “They have Moses and the prophets. Let them listen to them.” (Luke 16:29). In his Sermon 115, Augustine warns that waiting for miraculous signs is foolish when the Word of God is already sufficient: “If they do not hear Moses and the prophets, neither will they believe if one rises from the dead.” (v. 31). For Augustine the matter that has always plagued humankind in our relationship to God is hardness of heart. The hardness of heart we display for those around has its own measure in the hardness of our hearts to follow the Word of God.
Across military histories of the War in the Pacific the phrase “strategic bombing” is used and refers to B-29 Superfortresses flying out of the Mariana Islands (Saipan, Tinian, and Guam) and bombing the Japanese home islands of Honshu and Kyushu. Strategic bombing was an idea that grew out of the experience of air power in the First World War. Military theorists such as airpower advocates like the Italian Giulio Douhet, Britain’s Hugh Trenchard, and General William “Billy” Mitchell became influential in shaping the concept during the 1920s and 1930s. Douhet’s The Command of the Air (1921) and Mitchell’s Winged Defense (1925) became the starting point of thought and planning about the future of air warfare, strategic bombing in particular.
In Winged Defense Mitchell predicted that Japan would one day be America’s principal Pacific rival and that Tokyo itself could be struck by long-range strategic bombers launched from Pacific islands. His ideas were considered to be influential in a general way in the development of War Plan Orange but he was not personally involved in such planning. Nonetheless, the idea of strategic bombing had been planted.
This coming Sunday we continue in the Gospel of Luke with Jesus’ parable of the Rich Man and Poor Lazarus. We are describing the parable as a drama told in three acts. We are in midst of Act 3.
The Second Exchange. 27 He said, ‘Then I beg you, father, send him to my father’s house, 28 for I have five brothers, so that he may warn them, lest they too come to this place of torment.’ 29 But Abraham replied, ‘They have Moses and the prophets. Let them listen to them.’”
Here the rich man asks that Lazarus (again as servant) be sent back to warn the rich man’s surviving brothers. Seemingly accepting his fate, he at least gives evidence of thinking of another person. “But Abraham replied, ‘They have Moses and the prophets. Let them listen to them’” (v.29). Indeed, let us listen to them:
“If one of your kinsmen in any community is in need in the land which the LORD, your God, is giving you, you shall not harden your heart nor close your hand to him in his need. Instead, you shall open your hand to him and freely lend him enough to meet his need” (Dt 15:7-8)
During the early 1945 the war in the Pacific was inexorably drawing closer to the Japanese home islands. There were two major campaigns that were initiated in the Winter and early Spring:
Iwo Jima (Feb 19 – Mar 26, 1945)
Okinawa (Apr – Jun 1945)
Each of these campaigns were within range of Japanese aviation forces based on Kyushu and Honshu. A critical element of the above campaigns was the suppression of those aviation forces. That work fell to the U.S. Navy.
The Navy, freed from most major fleet engagements after the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf, shifted to directly attacking the Japanese homeland with multiple purposes in mind: suppression of aviation support for Okinawa and Iwo Jima; damage to industrial facilities, disruption of coastal shipping; elimination of the remnants of Japan’s Combined Fleet; disruption of rail-ferry links between Hokkaido and Honshu; cutting a key source of food shipments; disruption of the rail supply system leading from the Tokyo industrial area southward toward Kyushu and; presenting to the Japanese people that the Allied Forces could strike at will.
In February 1945 the first major aircraft raids were conducted in the Tokyo area. The objective was to neutralize Japanese air power prior to the Iwo Jima landings. Carrier aircraft from Task Force 58 struck Tokyo, Yokosuka, and nearby airfields, shipyards, and factories. Over 500 Japanese aircraft were destroyed (majority on the ground), some naval units damaged, including the carrier Amagi.
In the months following, US carriers pre-emptively struck Japan in preparation for the Okinawa landings. From April through June the US carriers supported the ongoing Okinawa operations by striking airfields in nearby Japan when necessary. Finally, by July 1945 Okinawa was secure and the full attention of the US and British fleets (carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers) could turn their attention to shore bombardment of Japan from Kyushu in the south to Hokkaido in the north with Honshu in between. While their reach was limited their accuracy was deadly. In late July the industrial and electronics-producing city of Hitachi was subject to shore bombardment. A key factory that had avoided destruction by air assault was level with four hits from the 16-inch guns of a US battleship.
While the July 1945 naval bombardment received little coverage, there are several key elements revealed regarding the state of the war in the Pacific:
Naval ships (carriers, battleships, cruisers, etc.) could approach the coast with impunity. By way of analogy, Japan was a medieval castle under siege. Outside the “walls” the Allied forces were free to operate; inside there was nothing to do except endure
At the same time, the Naval aviators and US Army Air Force bombers also operated without restriction.
The Allied fleet was free to aggressively sweep Home Island waters searching for Japanese warships and merchantmen.
The primary focus of this undeterred bombardment from sea and air was focused on Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu. Targets included:
Pre-invasion bombardment of potential Kyushu landing beaches and the inland areas immediately adjacent to the beaches to begin the “softening” on the in-depth defense and on-going construction of the same.
Japanese airfields and aircraft production sites in order to minimize the operational capacity and ability to mount kamikaze attacks during
Transportation lines and hubs that would be used to supply/re-supply Kyushu (Japan was particularly dependent on coast shipping and railways as they had little to no developed roadways)
Coastal shipping and merchants attempting to import supplies – including food – to Japan
At this point, by any effective measure, Japan was under an almost complete blockade. Only the Korea-Japan shipping channels were available and only under the cover of weather which limited the ability of the allies to find and track the merchants.
Image credit: various photographs from Naval Aviation Museum, National World War II Museum, and US Navy Archives.
This coming Sunday we continue in the Gospel of Luke with Jesus’ parable of the Rich Man and Poor Lazarus. We are describing the parable as a drama told in three acts. This is Act 3. To a first century hearer of the parable, the fates of the two would have been surprising for it went against the grain of the common wisdom: blessings in this life were a sign of God’s favor while illness, poverty, and hardship were a sign of God’s curses. Yet the one well “blessed” in his lifetime is now tormented in the netherworld (see the Note on 16:23 below) where he can see Lazarus and Abraham across the great chasm that divides them (v.26).
The First Exchange. 24 And he cried out, ‘Father Abraham, have pity on me. Send Lazarus to dip the tip of his finger in water and cool my tongue, for I am suffering torment in these flames.’ 25 Abraham replied, ‘My child, remember that you received what was good during your lifetime while Lazarus likewise received what was bad; but now he is comforted here, whereas you are tormented. 26 Moreover, between us and you a great chasm is established to prevent anyone from crossing who might wish to go from our side to yours or from your side to ours.’
In today’s Gospel, Jesus sends out the Twelve with power and authority to cast out demons, to cure diseases, and to proclaim the Kingdom of God. It’s a dramatic moment. They are given extraordinary gifts and a clear mission. But what about us? Most of us are not sent with power over demons. We are not miracle workers. We are not itinerant preachers going from village to village. So how does this Gospel speak to us?
While the form of our mission in the world may differ, the heart of the mission remains the same. Jesus sends the Twelve to do two basic things: proclaim the Kingdom and heal the broken. And that remains our mission in our time and place.
The capture of the Saipan and Tinian (July 1944) gave the allies air bases for the B-29 Super Fortress bombers. The home islands of Japan were within range and the Allies were now able to initiate sustained bombing of Japan without risking aircraft carriers which would have operated within range of Japanese counter attacks. The B-29 raids began on November 24, 1944. Tokyo was the first target. It consisted of 111 B-29s striking the Musashino aircraft engine plant on the outskirts of Tokyo. The raid was executed as a high-altitude precision raid (but with little effect). As noted in a previous post, the Allies faced major challenges over Japan: high-altitude jet stream winds disrupted bombing accuracy; weather conditions, especially cloud cover, reduced visibility.
The bombing campaign was focused on Japanese cities. The goal was to destroy key industrial and military targets such as aircraft factories, shipyards, and transportation hubs. The strategy was modeled on the efforts against Nazi Germany which concentrated production in large factory settings. Japanese industry was decentralized, with small workshops spread throughout urban residential areas. These workshops were as small as home-based, then feeding large operations, still in residential areas, again working up the supply chains to large operations, often located on the edge of residential areas. While there were critical war production located apart from residential areas, e.g. shipyards, other production (ammunition, airplane assembly, weapons, etc) took place in the labyrinth of major city residential areas.
friarmusings 