In the previous posts we considered the early years of Hirohito’s time on the throne and tried to give a sense of what his role was and wasn’t as Emperor, his sense of the limits of his authority and role, and the events which – at least from the outside – seemed to show a “self-induced neutrality” in governance. The previous post also showed that loyalty to the throne had practical limits as seen in the frequent assassination attempts and attempted coup-d’etat. This “civil unrest” would be ever in the back of Hirohito’s mind. In addition, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) had a track record of doing what it wanted (e.g. Manchuria and establishing the puppet nation of Manchukuo).
The 1930s saw Japan withdraw from the League of Nations, naval treaties, and expand its empire into other parts of China, Korea, Taiwan, and French Indochina. Also, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy (1940) which was at war with the rest of Europe and parts of the Middle East.
The posts this week have been attempting to take a walk through Japan’s history from the end of the Shogunate period, into the Meiji Restoration of the 19th century, and following the flow of people, events and ideology that brought us into pre-War 1930s Japan. It is a decade during which the “manifest destiny” of Japan is evident in its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere policy. As I wrote in the previous post:
“Asian countries should come together under Japan’s leadership to be free from Western colonial powers (like Britain, France, and the U.S.). On paper, it sounded like a partnership — ‘Asians helping Asians.’ Japan said it would bring prosperity, unity, and independence to Asia. In reality, though, it mostly meant that Japan would dominate the region, control its economies, and use its resources for Japan’s benefit. So instead of being true cooperation, it was more like Japan building an empire with kinder and gentler language and imagery.”
Within Japan, the slogan “Hakko ichiu” (“the eight corners of the world under one roof”) — drawn from Shinto mythology — became the fundamental idea, asserting that Japan had a divine mission to unify the world under the emperor’s benevolence. It is a big vision and it has to start somewhere. That “somewhere” was Manchuria.
Although overly simplified, for our purposes, State Shinto and the person of Emperor Hirohito form an imperial ideology that became a central pillar of Japanese foreign policy in the days leading up to the War in the Pacific – or as several historians rightly assert, the Asia Pacific War.
After Korea’s annexation and incorporation into Japan’s sphere (1910–1920s), there was an intentional program to consolidate the idea of “Sacred Rule.” In Korea, Taiwan, and other territories, Japan built Shinto shrines and required participation in rituals, symbolically binding colonial subjects to the emperor. School curricula emphasized emperor worship and loyalty, teaching that Japan’s overseas expansion was the natural extension of the divine nation’s growth. The slogan “Hakko ichiu” (“the eight corners of the world under one roof”) — drawn from Shinto mythology — began to circulate, suggesting Japan had a divine mission to unify the world under the emperor’s benevolence.
In the previous post we considered, in broad terms, that the Meiji Reforms of 19th Century Japan was the seedbed for an elevated position of the military in government and in the minds of the people. This rise occurred in the context of an essential idea that Japan needed to take its place among the powerful nations of the world, not only as an economic necessity but as a moral imperative rooted in its self-understanding through the eyes of Shinto religion. It is perhaps best understood in the Western parlance as Japan’s “Manifest Destiny.”
In the previous post we considered the Regent Hirohito and the time in which he lived before ascending the throne. It was a time where the founders and elder statesmen of the Meiji Reform were dying or being assassinated. There were centers of power/influence all seeking more power and influence: the military, civil government, the Diet (Parliament), the Imperial Court, and leaders in civil society. In a way this story is as old as time, but in Japan the democratic institutions were new and offered levers of power and influence that were not necessarily part of the fabric of Japanese history and life.
To understand how we arrive at the ultra-nationalist and militaristic Japan of the 1930s, we need to look at the Meiji Reforms and the role the Western powers played in the transformation of Japan.
As the War in the Pacific moves into 1945 it is clear that the Asia Pacific War will not end in victory for Japan. How will it end? For the Allies, the 1943 Casablanca Conference has already stated that the war in the Pacific will end in unconditional surrender as it soon will for Germany. But the nature of that war is different. Germany is virtually landlocked and is being pressed on its eastern, western and southern fronts. Japan is an island fortress. Japan sees the path leading to a decisive battle where either Japan wins or extracts such allied losses that the war ends at the negotiating table. It is like a high stakes hand of poker. The Allies have a strong hand but are they willing to go “all in” and invade the home islands as necessary. Japan is already committed to “all in” – or so it seems. But who is the hand holding the cards for Japan? Is it the Emperor, the Supreme War Council, the Military General Staff, or the Imperial Japanese Army across the far-flung empire?
We are at a point in this series when it is time for us to pause and return to the beginning to make sure we know the “hand holding the cards.” A good question is “how did it start.” And the answer is far more complicated than “when they attacked Pearl Harbor.”
A previous post offered a brief discussion of a complicated issue – the governance of wartime Japan. Such governance was a complicated, ritual process involving Emperor Hirohito and the Supreme War Council (“Big 6”). In the shadows of the ritual were the Lord of the Privy Seal (Kido) and other confidants of the royal family. Rather than detail the process, it is perhaps best explained by decisions around Ketsu Go.
On January 20, 1945 there was an Imperial audience in which senior Army and Navy leaders briefed the Emperor on the strategic concept for Ketsu Go. This was not a formal Gozen Kaigi (Imperial Conference), but an Imperial audience in which senior Army and Navy leaders briefed Hirohito. The principals in attendance were War Minister Anami and Army Chief Umezu – both hardliners – and Navy Chief Toyoda who at his point was supportive of the Army’s position.
It was not a detailed plan, but a strategic overview of Ketsu-Go in the context of the war: Leyte Island in the Philippines had fallen, there was no doubt that Iwo Jima and Okinawa would soon be invaded, and routine bombing of the home islands by B-29s had begun. All indications were that the southern island of Kyushu would be invaded in the late-summer to early-autumn of 1944. Most likely after the end of typhoon season which traditionally “ended” November 1st.
80 years ago today, September 2, 1945, the leaders of Japan signed the articles of surrender, ending the War in the Pacific. The treaty was signed aboard the USS Missouri anchored in Tokyo Bay. The document was signed by by representatives from Japan and from the Allied nations: the United States, Australia, New Zealand, China, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Canada, and France.
The document was first signed by the Japanese foreign minister Mamoru Shigemitsu and by General Yoshijirō Umezu, Chief of the Army General Staff. Both were later convicted of war crimes. Shigemitsu served 7 years but later served again as Japan’s foreign minister. Umezu was sentenced to life in prison. He died in prison from cancer on less than a year into his sentence.
The majority of all Japanese representatives present at the signing were later convicted of war crimes. Emperor Hirohito was not present at the ceremony.
Ketsu-Go (“Operation Decisive”) was Japan’s final defense plan in World War II. It outlined the defense of the Japanese home island. At this point in the war the plan is an Imperial Army-led plan with the Imperial Navy playing a limited role apart from Naval Aviation. As noted in the previous post, as from the outset of the war the Imperial Army was “in charge” – not only in the Supreme War Council but in operational planning.
The goal of Ketsu-Go was to mass Japan’s remaining troops, planes, and special attack units (kamikaze) to repel the invasion, especially on the southern island of Kyushu, expected to be the first invasion point – as it would be in the Allied plan for invasion. The hope of Ketsu-Go was to make the battle so bloody and costly for the Allies that they would lose the will to continue the invasion and offer better surrender terms than complete and absolute surrender. At stake was Kokutai, an expression that literally means “national body” or “national essence”. This is explored in greater detail in the next post, but sufficient for now, this concept was not differentiated from the Emperor and the royal household.
In Ketsu-Go there was a fundamental realization that this would not be a repeat of their 1905 naval victory at Tsushima but only a last ditch effort to achieve what was always the goal of the original Kantai Kessen – an armistice with the United States that left Japan and its early war gains intact. Ketsu-Go would run head-long into the Allied demand for unconditional surrender that had no intention of leaving Japan militarized or with any of its early war gains. The allied demand for unconditional surrender had already been decided at the Casablanca Conference two years earlier (January 1943).
In addition there was a more fundamental issue at play: the idea of surrender. For the western soldier, surrender was not good, but it was logical. When the circumstances indicated that you’d run out of options the only “reasonable” options were retreat (live to fight another day) or simply live and place yourself at the mercy of your captor. For the Japanese soldier, surrender was the greater shame. The view was grounded in a complex mix of military indoctrination, cultural values, and fear of dishonor. Surrender was considered not only shameful but a betrayal of one’s duty to the Emperor and nation – to the Kokutai.
This difference was clear from the beginning of the war. Consider General Wainwright’s decision to surrender the Bataan Peninsula (Philippines) at the beginning of the war. The Filipino and American troops were out of ammunition and food; further resistance meant sure death. Their Japanese captors considered them shameful cowards who had betrayed their country – and were treated as such, the Death March of Bataan giving ample evidence.
The Japanese resolve to not surrender was experienced in every land battle from Guadalcanal to Okinawa. In campaigns such as Tarawa, Biak, Kwajalein, Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Peliliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa fewer than 2% of the Japanese garrison was captured. The remainder fought to the death. At the same time the casualty rates among allied ground troops in the Pacific were rising especially in comparison to the European Theater of Operations. Here are comparative casualty rates:
D-Day Normandy France – 6-7%
Tarawa – 20%
Peliliu – 35%
Iwo Jima – 37%
Okinawa – 27%
These differences were well known to the American public.
From the high-levels of strategy to the on-the-ground reality of war, the mindset of the warring parties could not be farther apart. Ketsu-Go was not a strategy to win a battle or defend the Japanese home islands from devastation and death. It was a strategy to exact a high price of Allied casualties to avoid the shame of surrender. Ketsu-Go reflected a mindset that, if implemented, would extract an unimaginable price in human life and leave the survivors with scars for a lifetime.
Ketsu-Go was first presented to the Emperor in January 1945. In the background of the plan was the uniquely Japanese concept of kokutai.
Image credit: various photographs from Naval Aviation Museum, National World War II Museum, and US Navy Archives.
The Japanese could intercept Allied radio traffic, but they lacked the computational resources and personnel to break complex Allied codes like Naval Cypher No. 5. Their cryptanalytic efforts were centralized and bureaucratically fragmented, lacking the scale and success of U.S. or British efforts. As a result Japan remained largely blind to Allied operational planning, especially in the Central Pacific campaigns. In addition, their intelligence analysis and interpretation – especially on a strategic level – was hindered by their rigid military culture and intense rivalry between the Army and Navy. Their military intelligence units operated as though in silos. Intelligence was often ignored or suppressed if it conflicted with existing assumptions or the wishes of senior commanders who operated on biases about the lack of a warrior spirit among allied soldiers and sailors. The senior commanders also underestimated American industrial strength, technological innovation, and the ability to sustain large-scale operations across the Pacific.
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