In late September into early October, 1941Prime Minister Konoe floated the idea of a summit meeting with President Roosevelt. Konoe was increasingly convinced that Japan could not win a prolonged war with the United States, diplomacy through normal Foreign Ministry channels had stalled, and only a direct leader-to-leader meeting might override military rigidity on both sides. 

Konoe-Roosevelt Summit?

Roosevelt was intrigued but cautious. One of the great “what ifs” of the run-up to war was what if Roosevelt and Konoe had met. One of the problems for Konoe/Japan was the U.S. has already broken the Japanese diplomatic code (MAGIC). It was clear that Konoe did not have support of the Army, we understood that there needed to be unanimity among Japanese leaders directly advising the Emperor, and so it was clear that Konoe could not come to any meeting with the ability to commit the Japanese to anything agreed upon in any meeting. The fatal flaw was there was no real way to bypass the hardliners and militarists in Japan. 

Roosevelt had his own hardliners: the American First movement that did not believe that we should in any way be embroiled in foreign wars. They had already claimed Roosevelt was dragging the U.S. into war. So, if the President met Konoe without preconditions, opponents would accuse him of “appeasement” — the same word used against Britain at Munich in 1938. And hence Roosevelt insisted he needed “substantial evidence of sincerity” from Japan before he could even consider a summit.

Word was relayed via Ambassador Nomura that he might meet Konoe, but only if Japan showed good faith first. The US was the first to “put its cards on the table.” The US asked that:

• Japan must halt further aggression: no more moves into Southeast Asia or the Pacific.
• Respect the territorial integrity of China: withdraw from newly occupied zones and stop expansion.
• Renounce Axis obligations: the U.S. wanted assurances Japan would not support Germany if America entered the war in Europe.
• The U.S. would ease some trade restrictions. 

Japan’s counter proposal was

• U.S. to accept Manchukuo (Japanese puppet state of Manchuria) as legitimate.
• U.S. recognition of its “special position” in China, with acknowledgement of a new economic order in East Asia that included China
• Stop aid to Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist China 
• Stop reinforcing the Philippines and other U.S. Pacific outposts.
• Pledge to not interfere with Japan’s “Co-Prosperity Sphere.”
• Its alliance with Germany and Italy must be respected

At this point the positions were “oceans apart.” The Konoe–FDR summit was seriously “bandied about” in some channels, lingered tenuously into early October, and then disappeared entirely with Konoe’s resignation on Oct 18th. 

The Final Phase of Diplomacy

General Tōjō Hideki was appointed Prime Minister and immediately formed a new cabinet whose majority were military officers who supported the military move into Southeast Asia and war against the U.S. should diplomacy fail. The new cabinet directed the Foreign Ministry to draft a comprehensive proposal that might avert war while preserving Japan’s core positions in China. The draft took shape in late October and early November, under tight military oversight and with an explicit awareness of Japan’s dwindling oil reserves.  It would eventually construct two negotiating proposals: Plan A and Plan B.

“Plan A” was formally approved at an Imperial Conference on November 5, 1941. At the same conference, Japan also authorized continued military preparations and set a diplomatic deadline, making clear that negotiations would not be open-ended. The proposal was Japan’s first comprehensive peace proposal of the final negotiation phase. It was presented in Washington on November 7, 1941, by Ambassador Nomura (soon joined by Envoy Kurusu). Key details of the Japanese proposal included:

The proposal contained the following core elements:

• China: Japan would withdraw troops from most of China after the establishment of peace with Chiang Kai-shek. Manchuria (Manchukuo) was explicitly excluded from any withdrawal. Also, Japan insisted on a bilateral Japan–China settlement, not one imposed by the United States.
• Indochina: Japan promised no further military advance from Indochina into Southeast Asia. Japanese troops would be withdrawn from Indochina after peace was restored in East Asia, not immediately.
• Tripartite Pact: Japan reaffirmed adherence to the Tripartite Pact, while asserting it was defensive and did not threaten the U.S.
• Economic Relations: Restoration of normal trade relations, including access to oil. Mutual lifting of asset freezes. Economic cooperation between Japan and the United States.
• General Principles: Mutual non-aggression in the Pacific. Respect for territorial integrity as interpreted by Japan.

American officials concluded that the proposal did not require immediate withdrawal from China or Indochina and that what withdrawal was offered was at best contingent and vague while asking the U.S. to first restore trade and supply oil. The implication was that the U.S. would accept Japan’s continental gains. As a result, Proposal A was judged insufficient and evasive, though Washington did not immediately reject it outright. In fact, while Japan formally delivered its plan via diplomatic note, the U.S. never formally replied. Between Nov 12 and 15, Secretary Hull conveyed the U.S. position orally to Nomura (and later Kurusu) that Proposal A was insufficient:

• Conditional and delayed withdrawals from China were unacceptable
• Restoration of oil and trade could not precede concrete military withdrawal
• The U.S. could not recognize Japan’s “special position” in China

This was a clear negative signal, but not a formal diplomatic note. Japan understood the message. 

After U.S. officials made clear that Plan A would not be accepted, Prime Minister Tōjō directed the Foreign Ministry to prepare a minimal, provisional proposal designed primarily to secure short-term oil supplies while Japan completed military preparations. The draft took shape around November 15–18, with the Army and Navy insisting it be strictly temporary and not include withdrawal from China. The plan was approved at a Nov 19th Imperial Conference. The same conference reaffirmed Japan’s resolve to proceed with war preparations if negotiations failed, making clear that Plan B was a stopgap, not a compromise of peace. The proposal was presented in Washington on November 20, 1941, by Ambassador Nomura and Special Envoy Kurusu. It offered a temporary freeze on further military advances, limited Japanese withdrawals from southern Indochina, and non-aggression assurances, in exchange for partial unfreezing of assets and renewed oil shipments.

When the United States responded on November 26 with the Hull Note, Japanese leaders concluded that diplomacy had reached a dead end.

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Image credit: various photographs from Naval Aviation Museum, National World War II Museum, and US Navy Archive.