One of the things that surprised me about publishing (news, magazine articles, books, etc.) is how little control the author has over the title. That is the domain of the publisher and editors. The title is meant to hook you, to raise your curiosity and interest in the created content by the author. Several years ago I ran across a book with the following title “An Economist Walks Into a Brothel.” The publisher accomplished their mission; I bought the book. It is a book about risk – the ways we assess it and manage it. The first chapter was very interesting … and then it becomes less so. I probably need a publisher’s touch for the title of this post. I wonder how many times I will have changed it before I finally post it.

There is a lot of good information, scholarly articles, theological reflections, and more on just war theory. Some of it focuses on historical development. Some attempts to reinterpret the theory to fit modern context. Since the end of WW II that nature of war has changed whether we were paying attention or not. While always a threat, the likelihood of a “world war” is not (hopefully) on the horizon.  Since the end of World War II the conflicts have been geographically limited – the interested parties might well be many – but the breadth of the conflict is limited to a region or even a single country. Theorists speak in terms of warfare as

• Intranational
• Cross border
• Revolutionary overthrow energized by political systems
• Etc.

The war in Vietnam in the 60s and 70s was intranational (North v. South Vietnam), was also cross border and revolutionary (Viet Cong), but was not international in scope. The same or similar can be said of other conflicts in the last 80 years. But in the first quarter of this century, conflicts are increasingly urban warfare where proportionality and necessity vs. military advantage are increasingly difficult despite a focus on “rules of engagement” (ROE) for combat missions. The recent experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan are replete with examples.

Consider how different the Asia Pacific War is compared to the conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Serbia-Croatia, Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. These were just the wars involving the United States and don’t address the series of Pakistan-India wars (both of whom possess nuclear weapons) or the varied Israeli-Arab wars. The insurgencies are too many to list here.

In addition, armed combat increasingly involves people who do not have a view of Western just war theory. While some might point to the Geneva Convention as the international law equivalent thereof, such things can simply be ignored and withdrawn from.  Japan withdrew from the League of Nations and the Washington Naval Treaty when it suited their needs. Cross border and internal revolutionary forces are not signatories to any convention and have often demonstrated a pattern (e.g. people traditionally seen as non-combatants acting as suicide bombers, lookouts, scouts, being used as shields, etc.) whose immediate effect is to place the moral burden squarely on the shoulders of the warfighter.

Image credit: various photographs from Naval Aviation Museum, National World War II Museum, and US Navy Archives.

Truman’s questions and comments during the meeting reflected his own continuing unease over the level of US casualties. The President also expressed concern that an invasion of the homeland by Americans could carry a racial connotation in the minds of the Japanese that would unite them for a fight to the finish. Stimson said there was every indication that this would be the case. At the meeting’s end, Truman said he agreed that the plan presented by the Chiefs was the best choice under the circumstances, but he added that he “had hoped there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other.”

Truman gave the go-ahead to continue preparations for the Kyushu operation; he said the decision on a follow-on invasion of Honshu could be made later. The minutes of the meeting indicate that an explicit rationale for this postponement was to enable the President and his advisers to take into account the impact of the Kyushu campaign and the anticipated Soviet entry into the war. 

A great deal of the discussion about Just War theory focuses on the state and national polities especially before the war and in the context of the decision to declare war: jus en bellum. The focus is the justice of the cause. What is often overlooked, or at least not often spoken of, is the moral and spiritual burden borne by the warfighter.  Already in the Summa Theologiae (II–II, q.40), Aquinas notes that the individual soldier’s actions must be ordered toward right intention — not hatred, cruelty, or greed. That is not only to avoid sin, but also a recognition of the impact of war is very different on the foot soldier than on the monarch. St. Thomas does not offer more on the topic, but then it was not the focus of his writings.

In cinematic offerings before, during, and after WW II, combat was depicted as heroic: soldiers carrying out their righteous duty to protect their country, complete their mission, and sometimes, take the lives of their enemies. But the cinematic lens of that era rarely focused on what happens after the gunfire stops, after the explosions cease, and after a soldier takes another human’s life. The notable exception is “The Best Years of Our Lives.” The film, which won an Academy Award for Best Picture, follows three servicemen as they re-adjust to civilian life, dealing with issues like unemployment, physical disability, and the emotional toll of war. Movies of this century have more offering of the time after combat ends, leaving behind a harsh and devastating reality: the psychological toll of combat, specifically for those who have taken a life. Moral injuries have been part of the warrior culture throughout human history. There is a perilous journey into war and a perilous journey back. It is a journey that is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous.

This is an addendum to the “Olympic Decision” post. It continues the thread of thought that suggests President Truman left the June 18, 1945 without a firm answer to expected losses – not to say he wasn’t briefed later. But it also addresses the historians who offer that post-war Truman inflated the estimated US losses associated with an invasion to “more than a million.”

In the earlier article it was posited that based on Japanese troop strength on Kyushu by the end of July and a casualty rate similar to Okinawa, there would be an estimated 792,000 allied casualties. By and large those are ground force casualties and do not account for shipboard naval losses. In Admiral Nimitz’s early May estimate, his planning staff projected massive losses due to kamikaze attacks: 25 aircraft carriers, 10 battleships, and 40 cruisers and destroyers. Japanese documents and testimony of naval leadership indicated that the Kyushu kamikaze efforts would be primarily aimed at troop transports and supply ships. The troop ships (Attack Transport-AP) varied in size but this will give you an idea of the capacity. 

This would be at three different beachheads.

The previous post ended with this: “The question of interest is jus bello (in war), especially as it concerns the ways and means to end the Asia Pacific War. In the language of Just War Theory – were the ways and means “proportional” and was adequate care given to the question of non-combatant injury and death.? In preparing to write on this topic I am not sure how to best describe the reading and research.  The following expressions come to mind: “down the rabbit hole,” “swamp,” and “forget the forest, I am still looking for trees.” Whereas the conditions for establishing jus ad bellum are consistent and have been clearly expressed, not so much for jus bello. It is an understatement to say there are “different schools of  thought.” The debate centers on two concepts: proportionality and necessity – that are intertwined.

One of the schools of thought are the “consequentialists.” Although I did not see a delineation of “schools with a school,” the literature certainly seemed to indicate a wide division in views of writers that would be counted as consequentialists. For the sake of brevity, I would label them the “wide” and “narrow” schools of thought and would provide an example of each (with apologies to just war theorists and their work.)

After the May 1945 German surrender, arrangements were made for the Allies to meet in Potsdam, Germany. The topics were to settle the postwar arrangements for Europe and to reach agreement on coordinated Allied military operations against Japan. A month before the mid-July Potsdam Conference, President Truman met with his senior advisers to go over plans for ending the war with Japan and to prepare himself for Potsdam. In a 14 June memorandum to the service chiefs setting up this meeting, his Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy, said the President wanted to:

“. . . discuss details of our campaign against Japan. He expects at this meeting to be thoroughly informed of our intentions and prospects in preparation for his discussions with Churchill and Stalin. He wants an estimate of the time required and an estimate of the losses in killed and wounded that will result from an invasion of Japan proper. He wants an estimate of the time and the losses that will result from an effort to defeat Japan by isolation, blockade, and bombardment by sea and air forces. It is his intention to make his decision on the campaign with the purpose of economizing to the maximum extent possible in the loss of American lives. Economy in the use of time and money cost is comparatively unimportant. I suggest that a memorandum discussion of the above noted points be prepared in advance for delivery to the President at the time of the meeting. . . .”

In the previous post we considered the basis of modern just war theory in the writings and reflections of St. Thomas Aquinas. His thoughts became the basis for reflection on wars prior to the 20th century. For example, in the 16th century the Dominican Francisco de Vitoria applied just war thinking to Spain’s wars of conquest in the Americas. While he rejected armed conflict against indigenous people for the cause of conversion, he argued that the Spanish explorers had freedom to be in the foreign lands and their defense was just.  Thomas’ thoughts were applied to conflicts between Christian monarchs, regional disputes, and the such. It was not until the 17th century that Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, used the theory and applied just war reasoning to the Thirty Years’ War and European state conflicts. His work was foundational in international law and guided legal-political thinking for centuries. It also reflected the changing nature of war in the western European world.

In a very different setting, during the Crusades of the 11th–13th centuries, medieval theologians and canonists defended the Crusades as just wars under Aquinas’ principles. Their understanding was that the wars met the criteria: legitimate authority in the Pope; a just cause in defense of pilgrims and recovery of holy places;  and the right intention, namely service to God. It was not until the late 16th century in the work of Francisco Suárez that “proportionality” was considered.

In May 1945, Germany surrendered unconditionally. Many commentators offer that this would have been the optimal time to organize discussions with the Allies about a negotiated peace, preempt Russian involvement in the Pacific War, and end the war on terms acceptable to Japan. No attempts were made – nor were they likely to have gotten “off the ground.” The mindset of the Council was devotion to the Ketsu-Go plan. Suzuki had zero possibility of reaching a unanimous Council position in order to present such an option to the Emperor.

Meanwhile, during this time period, Leyte has fallen, Luzon is all-but-defeated, Iwo Jima has been taken, and  Okinawa is in progress. Allied bombing and firebombing continues. The submarine blockade is tightening its hold. The last oil tanker reached Japan in March 1945. Japan had their oil, gas and aviation fuel reserves and no hope to replenish their stock – which was more than 1 million barrels.  At the same time B-29 sealane mining is grinding coastal sea traffic to a halt, naval shore bombardment continues and there is no decisive battle left save Okinawa (doubtful) or Ketsu-Go, the defense of the home islands.

In this time period Emperor Hirohito had asked for two reports: (a) Estimate of the World Situation (prepared by the Army staff) and (b) Sōri Daijin Hōkoku – “Report to the Prime Minister” (prepared by Admiral Sakomizu). Sakomizu was asked to produce an objective, comprehensive assessment of Japan’s military, economic, and social condition to guide decisions about continuing or ending the war. The report painted a grim and realistic picture.

In the modern age, the average Catholic looks to the Catechism of the Catholic Church to find guidance on the concept of just war. The Church teaches that war can be morally justified under certain conditions, which are rooted in the principles of just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, and proportionality. (Found in paragraphs 2307 to 2317). The conditions fall into three broad categories:

• jus ad bellum (before the war)
• Jus in bello (during the war)
• jus post bellum (after the war)

The first four conditions address jus ad bellum.

It was a busy month. Mounting military losses and the inability of Prime Minister Koiso to garner consensus within the War Council led to the collapse of the government and the appointment of Admiral Suzuki as Prime Minister. It takes time to form a government – and meanwhile there is a lot going on. Iwo Jima is reaching its bloody end just as Okinawa begins to unfold. The losses among land forces, naval personnel (viz. kamikaze) and especially among civilians will be horrific and impactful.

Some argue that April 1945 was a lost opportunity. Suzuki was the new prime minister and there are those historians who assert that he was an advocate for peace. That is probably wishful thinking. He was an absolute opponent of unconditional surrender but at the same time was a proponent of Ketsu-Go. He was not a hardliner like Army Chief of Staff Umezu and War Minister Anami, but one of his first acts was to sign a pledge presented by a delegation of generals from IJA/HQ that committed Suzuki to prosecute the war to its fullest as outlined in Ketsu-Go, the plan to defend the home islands to the bitter end – no surrender. Hardly a peace advocate.