As the summer progressed, the emperor and other key members of the inner leadership grew concerned and anxious that the civil order of Japan was threatened. In the breakdown of civil order, there was fear that the Japanese people would be ripe for a revolutionary moment. The root cause of growing dissatisfaction was the slow realization that the reports of Japanese victories were simply wrong. They had daily evidence that allied bombers controlled the skies and were unhindered in their devastating fire-bombing attacks on cities. The vaunted Japanese military could not protect them. 

Food Crisis and the “domestic situation”

At the same time it was clear that the food situation was becoming increasingly dire. For too long Japan had relied on food from Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria, and occupied territories. U.S. naval blockade had cut off imports, and domestic stockpiles were being depleted. Japan did not have a developed roadway system and so internal distribution of food and supplies were dependent upon rail and coastal transport. US bombers targeted train tunnels in the mountainous and hilly regions. At the same time, B-29 continued the mining of the coastal waterways, dramatically reducing the capacity of that transportation system.

Prior to 1941, 40% of Japan’s rice was imported, primarily from Korea and China. By the summer of 1945 those imports fell to virtually zero. The Japanese government instituted food stuffs to replace rice: soybean, sweet potatoes, wheat, barley, millet and a variety of greens. The problem was that these substitutes did not provide the caloric intake needed. But even more, rice was not just a staple but a cultural cornerstone. Its scarcity created a deep psychological blow as it “whisphered” wartime defeat. The food problems led to malnutrition, absenteeism from work, and other social problems. “The domestic situation” became the euphemism describing the building dynamic. They projected the real crisis would come in the fall, particularly when the rice crop was due. The 1945 rice harvest was expected to be only 50% of the normal harvest.

Many commentaries, focused on the use of atomic weapons, suggest that use of such weapons of mass destruction was not necessary given that Japan was attempting to open peace negotiations via the Soviets as intermediaries. As noted in earlier posts, if one wishes to assert that peace negotiations via the Soviets was a viable pathway, one needs to account for the history of Japanese-Soviet relations which in general had always been contentious. Military actions include the 1903-1905 Japanese-Soviet war which concluded with a resounding Japanese victory at the naval battle of Tsushima, the 1939 Japanese invasion (unsuccessful) of Soviet-held Mongolia, and a long history of border conflict in northern Manchuria and Siberia.

The 1939 German–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact surprised Japan. Berlin, its nominal Axis partner, had essentially made peace with Moscow just as Japan had been fighting the Soviets. This left Tokyo diplomatically exposed. With tensions high, both Japan and the USSR had reasons to avoid a two-front war. The Soviets feared German aggression. By securing peace with Japan in the east, he could concentrate forces in the west. A neutrality pact would allow Japan to focus on expansion southward (toward Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines) without worrying about Siberia. The pact was signed on April 13, 1941. Both sides pledged to respect each other’s territorial integrity and neutrality if either was attacked by a third power. On April 5, 1945 the Soviets informed Japan that they would not renew the pact in April 1946. But on the same day, the Soviets began deploying approximately 1 million soldiers to the Far East in fulfillment of a 1943 pledge to the Allies to enter the Asia-Pacific war within 3 months of the surrender of Germany. 

Much of the Just War Theory conversations (apart from what I have called narrow consequentialism) centers on the deaths of civilian populations. Broadly reading the available literature there seems to be a rating of moral importance in which the moral weight is given to civilians over drafted military over volunteer military. In part, it is the theorist’s way to nuance out the factors involved in thinking through jus bello decisions. For example, if the only way to save 100,000 of our civilians’ lives from terrorist attacks is by bombing another country’s cities and intentionally killing 10,000 of its citizens – would it be an action jus bello? Or, what if some enemy civilians place themselves as voluntary shields around a military target, hoping to deter attacks on it. Have they become combatants? What if they are not voluntary but are being forced into that role as happened in the Battle of Manila? What if citizens, dressed as citizens, are part of a military charge against defended positions such as happened on Saipan? What if citizens have workshops, critical to war production, adjacent to their house as was common in Tokyo and other major industrial cities of Japan? What if only 20% of the homes in a neighborhood have such workshops but the majority of other residents work in the larger factory where home workshop items are assembled into war materials and weapons? 

And if the larger goal is to end the Asia Pacific war to stop the mass deaths of non-Japanese citizens in Japanese-occupied territories, is it proportional and necessary to not intend, but to know that it is inevitable that Japanese civilians will die because of allied military actions that are scaled up to a national level? What if the action is not direct attack by armed forces and weapons, but simply the blockade of the aggressor nation that will result in increasing civilian deaths by starvation until the nations, already militarily defeated, finally politically surrenders?

When one talks about Japan’s efforts to end the war, there are those who claim there were numerous attempts, all of which were ignored by the Allies. There were indeed several and they were, for the most part, simply “noted.” The Allies then waited to see what might become of the Japanese inquiry.

What one must keep in mind is that diplomats, intermediaries, and private citizens can all be in conversation with important, well-placed individuals of other governments. Those individuals might informally pass along information, but there will be no substantive conversations that have a hope of going anywhere unless the government knows the inquiry was authorized by the Japanese government – not just the Foreign Minister, but the Supreme Council and Emperor – and there is some kind of “term sheet” outlining “this is what we want to talk about” and here is “the opening position.” Otherwise, it is just talk.

One of the things that surprised me about publishing (news, magazine articles, books, etc.) is how little control the author has over the title. That is the domain of the publisher and editors. The title is meant to hook you, to raise your curiosity and interest in the created content by the author. Several years ago I ran across a book with the following title “An Economist Walks Into a Brothel.” The publisher accomplished their mission; I bought the book. It is a book about risk – the ways we assess it and manage it. The first chapter was very interesting … and then it becomes less so. I probably need a publisher’s touch for the title of this post. I wonder how many times I will have changed it before I finally post it.

There is a lot of good information, scholarly articles, theological reflections, and more on just war theory. Some of it focuses on historical development. Some attempts to reinterpret the theory to fit modern context. Since the end of WW II that nature of war has changed whether we were paying attention or not. While always a threat, the likelihood of a “world war” is not (hopefully) on the horizon.  Since the end of World War II the conflicts have been geographically limited – the interested parties might well be many – but the breadth of the conflict is limited to a region or even a single country. Theorists speak in terms of warfare as

• Intranational
• Cross border
• Revolutionary overthrow energized by political systems
• Etc.

The war in Vietnam in the 60s and 70s was intranational (North v. South Vietnam), was also cross border and revolutionary (Viet Cong), but was not international in scope. The same or similar can be said of other conflicts in the last 80 years. But in the first quarter of this century, conflicts are increasingly urban warfare where proportionality and necessity vs. military advantage are increasingly difficult despite a focus on “rules of engagement” (ROE) for combat missions. The recent experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan are replete with examples.

Consider how different the Asia Pacific War is compared to the conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Serbia-Croatia, Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. These were just the wars involving the United States and don’t address the series of Pakistan-India wars (both of whom possess nuclear weapons) or the varied Israeli-Arab wars. The insurgencies are too many to list here.

In addition, armed combat increasingly involves people who do not have a view of Western just war theory. While some might point to the Geneva Convention as the international law equivalent thereof, such things can simply be ignored and withdrawn from.  Japan withdrew from the League of Nations and the Washington Naval Treaty when it suited their needs. Cross border and internal revolutionary forces are not signatories to any convention and have often demonstrated a pattern (e.g. people traditionally seen as non-combatants acting as suicide bombers, lookouts, scouts, being used as shields, etc.) whose immediate effect is to place the moral burden squarely on the shoulders of the warfighter.

Image credit: various photographs from Naval Aviation Museum, National World War II Museum, and US Navy Archives.

Truman’s questions and comments during the meeting reflected his own continuing unease over the level of US casualties. The President also expressed concern that an invasion of the homeland by Americans could carry a racial connotation in the minds of the Japanese that would unite them for a fight to the finish. Stimson said there was every indication that this would be the case. At the meeting’s end, Truman said he agreed that the plan presented by the Chiefs was the best choice under the circumstances, but he added that he “had hoped there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other.”

Truman gave the go-ahead to continue preparations for the Kyushu operation; he said the decision on a follow-on invasion of Honshu could be made later. The minutes of the meeting indicate that an explicit rationale for this postponement was to enable the President and his advisers to take into account the impact of the Kyushu campaign and the anticipated Soviet entry into the war. 

A great deal of the discussion about Just War theory focuses on the state and national polities especially before the war and in the context of the decision to declare war: jus en bellum. The focus is the justice of the cause. What is often overlooked, or at least not often spoken of, is the moral and spiritual burden borne by the warfighter.  Already in the Summa Theologiae (II–II, q.40), Aquinas notes that the individual soldier’s actions must be ordered toward right intention — not hatred, cruelty, or greed. That is not only to avoid sin, but also a recognition of the impact of war is very different on the foot soldier than on the monarch. St. Thomas does not offer more on the topic, but then it was not the focus of his writings.

In cinematic offerings before, during, and after WW II, combat was depicted as heroic: soldiers carrying out their righteous duty to protect their country, complete their mission, and sometimes, take the lives of their enemies. But the cinematic lens of that era rarely focused on what happens after the gunfire stops, after the explosions cease, and after a soldier takes another human’s life. The notable exception is “The Best Years of Our Lives.” The film, which won an Academy Award for Best Picture, follows three servicemen as they re-adjust to civilian life, dealing with issues like unemployment, physical disability, and the emotional toll of war. Movies of this century have more offering of the time after combat ends, leaving behind a harsh and devastating reality: the psychological toll of combat, specifically for those who have taken a life. Moral injuries have been part of the warrior culture throughout human history. There is a perilous journey into war and a perilous journey back. It is a journey that is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous.

This is an addendum to the “Olympic Decision” post. It continues the thread of thought that suggests President Truman left the June 18, 1945 without a firm answer to expected losses – not to say he wasn’t briefed later. But it also addresses the historians who offer that post-war Truman inflated the estimated US losses associated with an invasion to “more than a million.”

In the earlier article it was posited that based on Japanese troop strength on Kyushu by the end of July and a casualty rate similar to Okinawa, there would be an estimated 792,000 allied casualties. By and large those are ground force casualties and do not account for shipboard naval losses. In Admiral Nimitz’s early May estimate, his planning staff projected massive losses due to kamikaze attacks: 25 aircraft carriers, 10 battleships, and 40 cruisers and destroyers. Japanese documents and testimony of naval leadership indicated that the Kyushu kamikaze efforts would be primarily aimed at troop transports and supply ships. The troop ships (Attack Transport-AP) varied in size but this will give you an idea of the capacity. 

This would be at three different beachheads.

The previous post ended with this: “The question of interest is jus bello (in war), especially as it concerns the ways and means to end the Asia Pacific War. In the language of Just War Theory – were the ways and means “proportional” and was adequate care given to the question of non-combatant injury and death.? In preparing to write on this topic I am not sure how to best describe the reading and research.  The following expressions come to mind: “down the rabbit hole,” “swamp,” and “forget the forest, I am still looking for trees.” Whereas the conditions for establishing jus ad bellum are consistent and have been clearly expressed, not so much for jus bello. It is an understatement to say there are “different schools of  thought.” The debate centers on two concepts: proportionality and necessity – that are intertwined.

One of the schools of thought are the “consequentialists.” Although I did not see a delineation of “schools with a school,” the literature certainly seemed to indicate a wide division in views of writers that would be counted as consequentialists. For the sake of brevity, I would label them the “wide” and “narrow” schools of thought and would provide an example of each (with apologies to just war theorists and their work.)