One of the things that surprised me about publishing (news, magazine articles, books, etc.) is how little control the author has over the title. That is the domain of the publisher and editors. The title is meant to hook you, to raise your curiosity and interest in the created content by the author. Several years ago I ran across a book with the following title “An Economist Walks Into a Brothel.” The publisher accomplished their mission; I bought the book. It is a book about risk – the ways we assess it and manage it. The first chapter was very interesting … and then it becomes less so. I probably need a publisher’s touch for the title of this post. I wonder how many times I will have changed it before I finally post it.

There is a lot of good information, scholarly articles, theological reflections, and more on just war theory. Some of it focuses on historical development. Some attempts to reinterpret the theory to fit modern context. Since the end of WW II that nature of war has changed whether we were paying attention or not. While always a threat, the likelihood of a “world war” is not (hopefully) on the horizon.  Since the end of World War II the conflicts have been geographically limited – the interested parties might well be many – but the breadth of the conflict is limited to a region or even a single country. Theorists speak in terms of warfare as

• Intranational
• Cross border
• Revolutionary overthrow energized by political systems
• Etc.

The war in Vietnam in the 60s and 70s was intranational (North v. South Vietnam), was also cross border and revolutionary (Viet Cong), but was not international in scope. The same or similar can be said of other conflicts in the last 80 years. But in the first quarter of this century, conflicts are increasingly urban warfare where proportionality and necessity vs. military advantage are increasingly difficult despite a focus on “rules of engagement” (ROE) for combat missions. The recent experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan are replete with examples.

Consider how different the Asia Pacific War is compared to the conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Serbia-Croatia, Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. These were just the wars involving the United States and don’t address the series of Pakistan-India wars (both of whom possess nuclear weapons) or the varied Israeli-Arab wars. The insurgencies are too many to list here.

In addition, armed combat increasingly involves people who do not have a view of Western just war theory. While some might point to the Geneva Convention as the international law equivalent thereof, such things can simply be ignored and withdrawn from.  Japan withdrew from the League of Nations and the Washington Naval Treaty when it suited their needs. Cross border and internal revolutionary forces are not signatories to any convention and have often demonstrated a pattern (e.g. people traditionally seen as non-combatants acting as suicide bombers, lookouts, scouts, being used as shields, etc.) whose immediate effect is to place the moral burden squarely on the shoulders of the warfighter.

Image credit: various photographs from Naval Aviation Museum, National World War II Museum, and US Navy Archives.

Truman’s questions and comments during the meeting reflected his own continuing unease over the level of US casualties. The President also expressed concern that an invasion of the homeland by Americans could carry a racial connotation in the minds of the Japanese that would unite them for a fight to the finish. Stimson said there was every indication that this would be the case. At the meeting’s end, Truman said he agreed that the plan presented by the Chiefs was the best choice under the circumstances, but he added that he “had hoped there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other.”

Truman gave the go-ahead to continue preparations for the Kyushu operation; he said the decision on a follow-on invasion of Honshu could be made later. The minutes of the meeting indicate that an explicit rationale for this postponement was to enable the President and his advisers to take into account the impact of the Kyushu campaign and the anticipated Soviet entry into the war. 

A great deal of the discussion about Just War theory focuses on the state and national polities especially before the war and in the context of the decision to declare war: jus en bellum. The focus is the justice of the cause. What is often overlooked, or at least not often spoken of, is the moral and spiritual burden borne by the warfighter.  Already in the Summa Theologiae (II–II, q.40), Aquinas notes that the individual soldier’s actions must be ordered toward right intention — not hatred, cruelty, or greed. That is not only to avoid sin, but also a recognition of the impact of war is very different on the foot soldier than on the monarch. St. Thomas does not offer more on the topic, but then it was not the focus of his writings.

In cinematic offerings before, during, and after WW II, combat was depicted as heroic: soldiers carrying out their righteous duty to protect their country, complete their mission, and sometimes, take the lives of their enemies. But the cinematic lens of that era rarely focused on what happens after the gunfire stops, after the explosions cease, and after a soldier takes another human’s life. The notable exception is “The Best Years of Our Lives.” The film, which won an Academy Award for Best Picture, follows three servicemen as they re-adjust to civilian life, dealing with issues like unemployment, physical disability, and the emotional toll of war. Movies of this century have more offering of the time after combat ends, leaving behind a harsh and devastating reality: the psychological toll of combat, specifically for those who have taken a life. Moral injuries have been part of the warrior culture throughout human history. There is a perilous journey into war and a perilous journey back. It is a journey that is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous.

This is an addendum to the “Olympic Decision” post. It continues the thread of thought that suggests President Truman left the June 18, 1945 without a firm answer to expected losses – not to say he wasn’t briefed later. But it also addresses the historians who offer that post-war Truman inflated the estimated US losses associated with an invasion to “more than a million.”

In the earlier article it was posited that based on Japanese troop strength on Kyushu by the end of July and a casualty rate similar to Okinawa, there would be an estimated 792,000 allied casualties. By and large those are ground force casualties and do not account for shipboard naval losses. In Admiral Nimitz’s early May estimate, his planning staff projected massive losses due to kamikaze attacks: 25 aircraft carriers, 10 battleships, and 40 cruisers and destroyers. Japanese documents and testimony of naval leadership indicated that the Kyushu kamikaze efforts would be primarily aimed at troop transports and supply ships. The troop ships (Attack Transport-AP) varied in size but this will give you an idea of the capacity. 

This would be at three different beachheads.