As the summer progressed, the emperor and other key members of the inner leadership grew concerned and anxious that the civil order of Japan was threatened. In the breakdown of civil order, there was fear that the Japanese people would be ripe for a revolutionary moment. The root cause of growing dissatisfaction was the slow realization that the reports of Japanese victories were simply wrong. They had daily evidence that allied bombers controlled the skies and were unhindered in their devastating fire-bombing attacks on cities. The vaunted Japanese military could not protect them. 

Food Crisis and the “domestic situation”

At the same time it was clear that the food situation was becoming increasingly dire. For too long Japan had relied on food from Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria, and occupied territories. U.S. naval blockade had cut off imports, and domestic stockpiles were being depleted. Japan did not have a developed roadway system and so internal distribution of food and supplies were dependent upon rail and coastal transport. US bombers targeted train tunnels in the mountainous and hilly regions. At the same time, B-29 continued the mining of the coastal waterways, dramatically reducing the capacity of that transportation system.

Prior to 1941, 40% of Japan’s rice was imported, primarily from Korea and China. By the summer of 1945 those imports fell to virtually zero. The Japanese government instituted food stuffs to replace rice: soybean, sweet potatoes, wheat, barley, millet and a variety of greens. The problem was that these substitutes did not provide the caloric intake needed. But even more, rice was not just a staple but a cultural cornerstone. Its scarcity created a deep psychological blow as it “whisphered” wartime defeat. The food problems led to malnutrition, absenteeism from work, and other social problems. “The domestic situation” became the euphemism describing the building dynamic. They projected the real crisis would come in the fall, particularly when the rice crop was due. The 1945 rice harvest was expected to be only 50% of the normal harvest.

Many commentaries, focused on the use of atomic weapons, suggest that use of such weapons of mass destruction was not necessary given that Japan was attempting to open peace negotiations via the Soviets as intermediaries. As noted in earlier posts, if one wishes to assert that peace negotiations via the Soviets was a viable pathway, one needs to account for the history of Japanese-Soviet relations which in general had always been contentious. Military actions include the 1903-1905 Japanese-Soviet war which concluded with a resounding Japanese victory at the naval battle of Tsushima, the 1939 Japanese invasion (unsuccessful) of Soviet-held Mongolia, and a long history of border conflict in northern Manchuria and Siberia.

The 1939 German–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact surprised Japan. Berlin, its nominal Axis partner, had essentially made peace with Moscow just as Japan had been fighting the Soviets. This left Tokyo diplomatically exposed. With tensions high, both Japan and the USSR had reasons to avoid a two-front war. The Soviets feared German aggression. By securing peace with Japan in the east, he could concentrate forces in the west. A neutrality pact would allow Japan to focus on expansion southward (toward Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines) without worrying about Siberia. The pact was signed on April 13, 1941. Both sides pledged to respect each other’s territorial integrity and neutrality if either was attacked by a third power. On April 5, 1945 the Soviets informed Japan that they would not renew the pact in April 1946. But on the same day, the Soviets began deploying approximately 1 million soldiers to the Far East in fulfillment of a 1943 pledge to the Allies to enter the Asia-Pacific war within 3 months of the surrender of Germany. 

Much of the Just War Theory conversations (apart from what I have called narrow consequentialism) centers on the deaths of civilian populations. Broadly reading the available literature there seems to be a rating of moral importance in which the moral weight is given to civilians over drafted military over volunteer military. In part, it is the theorist’s way to nuance out the factors involved in thinking through jus bello decisions. For example, if the only way to save 100,000 of our civilians’ lives from terrorist attacks is by bombing another country’s cities and intentionally killing 10,000 of its citizens – would it be an action jus bello? Or, what if some enemy civilians place themselves as voluntary shields around a military target, hoping to deter attacks on it. Have they become combatants? What if they are not voluntary but are being forced into that role as happened in the Battle of Manila? What if citizens, dressed as citizens, are part of a military charge against defended positions such as happened on Saipan? What if citizens have workshops, critical to war production, adjacent to their house as was common in Tokyo and other major industrial cities of Japan? What if only 20% of the homes in a neighborhood have such workshops but the majority of other residents work in the larger factory where home workshop items are assembled into war materials and weapons? 

And if the larger goal is to end the Asia Pacific war to stop the mass deaths of non-Japanese citizens in Japanese-occupied territories, is it proportional and necessary to not intend, but to know that it is inevitable that Japanese civilians will die because of allied military actions that are scaled up to a national level? What if the action is not direct attack by armed forces and weapons, but simply the blockade of the aggressor nation that will result in increasing civilian deaths by starvation until the nations, already militarily defeated, finally politically surrenders?

When one talks about Japan’s efforts to end the war, there are those who claim there were numerous attempts, all of which were ignored by the Allies. There were indeed several and they were, for the most part, simply “noted.” The Allies then waited to see what might become of the Japanese inquiry.

What one must keep in mind is that diplomats, intermediaries, and private citizens can all be in conversation with important, well-placed individuals of other governments. Those individuals might informally pass along information, but there will be no substantive conversations that have a hope of going anywhere unless the government knows the inquiry was authorized by the Japanese government – not just the Foreign Minister, but the Supreme Council and Emperor – and there is some kind of “term sheet” outlining “this is what we want to talk about” and here is “the opening position.” Otherwise, it is just talk.