The two previous posts were meant to give the reader a sense of the Emperor’s role in war-time governance in Japan. To be sure, I have not done the topic justice as just like “Washington insider” machinations (then and now) Japan had its own “system” to navigate to achieve decisions. Some of this was already covered. A review of two posts would be helpful: Ketsu-Go and Governance and Ketsu Go. The former describes Japanese plans for the “decisive battle” that would bring the Allies to a negotiation table and away from their demands for unconditional surrender. The latter describes the sequence of events that took Ketsu-Go from a strategic idea (January 45) to a formally approved plan of action (March 45) – and gave some sense of the internal factions within the government along with their agendas. In this post we look “behind the curtain.”

The previous posts have tried to show that Hirohito, as Emperor, moved from “self-induced neutrality” in decisions to a more animated Emperor in decisions about the war. He was briefed and was aware of war progress and failures. He asked critical questions. He knew of cases where the military subverted his expressed views. And he deftly navigated the reach and influence of his power while remaining the Emperor in a constitutional monarchy where the power lay with the military.

What is uncertain was the quality of information the Emperor was receiving. While there were cases in which military leaders hedged reports, these same leaders were at the mercy of field commander reports which often were greatly exaggerated. This was especially true among Imperial Army (IJA) ranks; less so from the Imperial Navy (IJN). It was hard to obfuscate the loss of aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers and more. A subtext of much of the reports, as the historian Edward Drea notes, was a dismissive view that “Americans [were] products of liberalism and individualism and incapable of fighting a protracted war.” This is what drove the Japanese to find the “Decisive Battle” to bring the Allies to a negotiation to end the war. Midway, Guadalcanal and especially Saipan were to be those battles. And yet the allies pressed forward with the war. The Emperor supported the drive to bring about the decisive battle – but as a necessary precursor to his end-game: a negotiated peace. Or perhaps a negotiated continuity of the Imperial Household.

In the summer of 1942, as outlined in the post “Before the War”, Japan pursued parallel paths: diplomacy and war preparations. The military (members of the cabinet, IJA Headquarters, and influential flag officers) flush with success in Manchuria, China and French Indo-China (Vietnam) wanted to unleash the Army against the entire Asia-Pacific region in order to establish the Empire of Japan under the guise of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Navy was circumspect with part of its leadership desirous of some means to achieve “glory for the Emperor” as the Army had already done. But another part of its leadership understood that meant taking on the US and British Pacific Fleets. The United States was particularly worrisome given three factors: (1) the fleet at Pearl Harbor, (2) that US shipyards were already building a new generation of aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers and fleet tankers that would be commissioned in 1942, and (3) that was without the full engagement of the industrial base of the nation.  That meant the war plan “decisive battle” would not be engaged in Philippine Island waters, but needed to be a “knockout blow” at Pearl Harbor to take out battleships and aircraft carriers. 

In the autumn of 1941 there were a series of Imperial Conferences (Gozen Kaigi) where Emperor Hirohito, his cabinet, and senior military leaders debated the U.S. demands for a diplomatic settlement and Japan’s course of action. The first of these conferences was held September 6, 1941 – “Imperial Conference on the Empire’s Future Policy.” The cabinet and military presented Hirohito with two paths: (a) continue negotiations with the U.S. and Britain and (b) preparation for war if negotiations failed. Hirohito approved a resolution: negotiations would continue, but war preparations must be ready by late October if talks broke down. The Emperor made it clear that diplomacy was the priority (for reasons outlined in the previous post) and so he accepted the parallel path, but also set a firm deadline for agreement or war.

The Second Imperial Conference was held November 5, 1941 after weeks of inconclusive Army-Navy-Cabinet debates it was agreed that the military would strike Pearl Harbor while also moving into Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines. At a final Imperial Conference on December 1, 1941. The cabinet reported to Hirohito that diplomatic negotiations had failed. The Army and Navy both argued that war was now unavoidable. Hirohito approved the resolution that war with the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands would begin in early December. Diaries record Hirohito as somber, but he gave no objection. His silence ratified the decision. Hirohito performed the ritual reading of the imperial rescript that authorized hostilities. The debate was closed. The Combined Fleet had already set sail for Pearl Harbor on November 26th. Army troops were already being deployed throughout the Asia Pacific region.

To understand in the inner workings of the wartime governance of Japan there are three keys to keep in mind:

1. Cabinet and Supreme War Council recommendations to the Emperor must be unanimous and if unanimity can not be reached, the government collapses and a new cabinet and council must be promoted.
2. In accord with the Meiji Constitution, certain cabinet members must be filled by active duty members of the military. In the context of #1 above, this means that the military holds a de facto veto on anything with which it does not agree. A single military member can either “filabuster” or simply resign – either achieve the same thing: collapse of the government.
3. In accord with the Meiji Constitution, the Emperor is a Constitutional Monarch, but at the same time is “Supreme Commander” of the Military (daigensui).

Does #3 mean that the “buck stops” with the Emperor? Hardly. As described in earlier posts, the received tradition was that the Emperor was not an absolute monarch – and that is consistent with the Meiji Constitution. Then again, the Emperor was not a symbolic monarch like the King of England. In practice, the Emperor’s role lived somewhere between the two on a spectrum of direct influence, passive influence, and removed from decision making. Emperor Hirohito’s father was quite removed from decision making or shaping the future of Japan. Hirohito was… well, that has been the subject of debate by historians for the last 80 years and more.

The post-war tribunals placed the blame and responsibility for the war on the military, ultranationalists, and the zaibatsu (financial clique). But Emperor Hirohito escaped post-war tribunals because Gen. MacArthur (SCAP – Supreme Commander for Allied Powers) excluded him from the tribunals for reasons associated with SCAP’s vision for post-war Japan. This provided a post-war orthodoxy that Emperor Hirohito was a peace loving constitutional monarch who could not prevent the military from their desire for war. That view could not withstand the passage of time and the declassification of wartime documents.