In the modern age, the average Catholic looks to the Catechism of the Catholic Church to find guidance on the concept of just war. The Church teaches that war can be morally justified under certain conditions, which are rooted in the principles of just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, and proportionality. (Found in paragraphs 2307 to 2317). The conditions fall into three broad categories:

• jus ad bellum (before the war)
• Jus in bello (during the war)
• jus post bellum (after the war)

The first four conditions address jus ad bellum.

It was a busy month. Mounting military losses and the inability of Prime Minister Koiso to garner consensus within the War Council led to the collapse of the government and the appointment of Admiral Suzuki as Prime Minister. It takes time to form a government – and meanwhile there is a lot going on. Iwo Jima is reaching its bloody end just as Okinawa begins to unfold. The losses among land forces, naval personnel (viz. kamikaze) and especially among civilians will be horrific and impactful.

Some argue that April 1945 was a lost opportunity. Suzuki was the new prime minister and there are those historians who assert that he was an advocate for peace. That is probably wishful thinking. He was an absolute opponent of unconditional surrender but at the same time was a proponent of Ketsu-Go. He was not a hardliner like Army Chief of Staff Umezu and War Minister Anami, but one of his first acts was to sign a pledge presented by a delegation of generals from IJA/HQ that committed Suzuki to prosecute the war to its fullest as outlined in Ketsu-Go, the plan to defend the home islands to the bitter end – no surrender. Hardly a peace advocate.

The title may have caught your eye and caused you to wonder about the dates. Shouldn’t the War in the Pacific be dated from December 7, 1941, the attack on Pearl Harbor, until September 2, 1945 and the surrender of Japan aboard the USS Missouri? Certainly those are the dates which involved the United States and her allies. But war in the Asia-Pacific region had already started with the Sino-Chinese war, long simmering, but breaking out into open warfare in 1937. Japan had occupied Manchuria since 1931, but then invaded much of China from 1937 onward, including Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, and the coastal regions). French Indochina (Vietnam) was invaded next: the North in 1940 followed by the South in 1941. Well before Pearl Harbor troops were already in position to launch attacks against Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Burma, Indonesia (Dutch East Indies), Malaysia and Singapore, Brunei and Borneo, Hong Kong, parts of New Guinea, the Marshall Islands, Truk, Palau, the Marshalls, and other Micronesian islands.  It should also be remembered that Japan ruled the Korean people during the 20th century.

The United States was drawn into a war already underway for more than 4 years.

The preliminary planning for Operation Downfall – the invasion of the Japanese home islands of Kyushu and Honshu – began in the waning months of 1944. These were preliminary plans at best and were secondary to battle planning for Leyte, Luzon, Iwo Jima, Okinawa and the naval aircraft carrier raids on Formosa, as well as the massive logistics planning to support all the amphibious landings.

By April 1945 only the amphibious landings at Okinawa remained – the other islands had been secured, although scattered actions continued on Luzon until the end of the war. It was at this point that area commanders (Nimitz and McArthur) were ordered to develop detailed, actionable plans for the invasion of the southern island of Kyushu (Operation Olympic). As noted in the previous post there were multiple planning units that were providing estimates. The operations and logistics details were massive, but each unit knew the “hard question” would be their estimates of allied casualties for Operation Olympic. 

But that question depended on their battle plan/order of battle and intelligence estimates of enemy troop strength and deployment. As will be made clear in subsequent posts, all the above was a moving target that was being shaped by a range of factors from the concrete and measurable to the personal and not quantifiable. The first phase of planning occurred in the Pacific theatre of operation from Nimitz’s and MacArthur’s operations group. This planning phase (and its iterations) lasted until May 25, 1945 at which point the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued a formal directive to Nimitz, MacArthur, and Arnold, instructing them to begin detailed planning for Operation Olympic. We’ll come back to that date.