The Nine-Dash Line

The Nine-Dash Line

The “Nine-Dash Line” is a map boundary used by the People’s Republic of China to claim large portions of the South China Sea. It is not directly a sovereignty claim over Taiwan, but it is closely connected to the broader China–Taiwan issue because both the government in People’s Republic of China (Beijing/PRC) and the government in Taiwan (the Republic of China, or ROC) historically inherited versions of the same maritime claims from pre-1949 China. But they are not the only countries with claims in the South China Sea. Claimants include Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei and the Philippines.

The line originated with the Republic of China government in 1947 as an “Eleven-Dash Line.” After the Chinese Civil War, the communist government in Beijing adopted and modified it into the current Nine-Dash Line. Taiwan’s ROC government still officially maintains a similar claim, though Taipei today emphasizes stability and practical administration more than expansive maritime nationalism. It is interesting to note that Beijing sometimes argues that Taiwan’s continued adherence to similar maritime claims supports the idea that both sides belong to “one China.”

The Nine-Dash Line matters because the South China Sea contains major international shipping lanes, commercial fishing grounds, potential oil and gas reserves and militarily is a key strategic location. PRC/China has used the claim to justify building shoals into artificial islands, establishing military facilities there and on naturally existing islands, as well as conducting aggressive coast guard and naval patrols. Reports and videos of aggressive  maritime engagements routinely appear online, in the news, and in maritime industry journals.

The Nine-Dash Line, in a way, is tangential to the China-Taiwan dispute. The Nine-Dash Line is primarily a South China Sea territorial claim, not a direct claim about Taiwan itself. However, it is important as Taiwan controls Taiping Island (Itu Aba), the largest naturally occurring island in the Spratly chain – and some 1,000 miles south-southwest of Taiwan. This gives Taiwan a direct physical role in South China Sea disputes. Taiwan also sits near the northern gateway to the South China Sea from the East China Sea and along critical naval routes connecting the Pacific Ocean to Chinese coastal waters. 

But the nations most impacted by aggressive PRC maritime patrols and attempts at enforcement are the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia. The South China Sea is important to these nations for the same reasons it is economically important to China.

Claims and Assertions

The origin of the “Nine-Dash Line” is rooted in a mixture of historical memory, nationalism, geography, imperial legacy, and modern state-building. It was not created out of nowhere as a purely arbitrary assertion, but neither was it historically defined in the precise modern legal sense that China sometimes presents today.

Chinese dynastic records from the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing periods contain references to islands, shoals, navigation routes, and fishing grounds in what is now called the South China Sea. For centuries, Chinese fishermen, merchants, and sailors traveled through the South China Sea. Chinese fishermen from Hainan and Guangdong regularly traveled seasonally into the Paracel and Spratly regions. Chinese sources also describe maritime trade routes through the area. Imperial Chinese records, navigation charts, and local gazetteers mention these areas intermittently. China argues that these activities demonstrate discovery and naming of islands, longstanding fishing usage, patrols and survey expeditions, and administrative awareness of the region. There is also archaeological evidence of extensive Chinese commercial activity seen in shipwrecks, porcelain cargoes, copper coins, and evidence of the old Maritime Silk Road crossing the South China Sea.

But the South China Sea was never an exclusively Chinese maritime zone historically. Vietnamese, Malay, Filipino, and other Southeast Asian fishermen and traders also operated throughout the region for centuries and can make the same historical and archaeological claims. Even some Chinese legal scholars acknowledge the sea historically functioned as a shared maritime space used by many peoples.

What’s more, pre-modern Asian states generally did not define maritime sovereignty the way modern international law does. It was understood that “control” was fluid and shifting as seen in tribute systems, fishing access, trade routes, or occasional patrols rather than fixed maritime borders. So there was a historical Chinese presence and awareness in the region, but not continuous modern-style administrative control over the entire sea. The same can be said about several other nations.

This is important because under modern international law, merely having fishermen or traders present does not automatically create sovereignty over enormous maritime areas.

The Modern Era

The 1947 assertion by the Republic of China government under the Kuomintang (still before the takeover by the Communist Chinese) reflected several motivations. It was reclaiming territory after Japanese occupation, asserting China’s status as a restored great power, resisting perceived Western and Japanese encroachment, and strengthening national unity after decades of invasion and civil war. When the communists won the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the government in Beijing took up the mantle of maritime claims.

For many Chinese people both in mainland China and Taiwan, the South China Sea claims became emotionally tied to the broader narrative of overcoming the “Century of Humiliation.” That narrative includes the Opium Wars, the Unequal Treaties that resulted from those wars, the resulting colonial concessions, the Japanese invasion, and the loss of sense from the foreign domination that was in place from the 19th to mid-20th centuries. In this mindset, recovering lost territories became symbolic of restoring national dignity and sovereignty. Many Chinese see the South China Sea claims not as expansionism, but as reversing historical injustice. But the counter-claimants in the region are not nations or peoples involved in any historical injustices against China.  The controversy is that historical usage, shifting periods of colonial dominance, and other factors are not automatically factors in modern legal sovereignty under international law. 

In 2016, an international tribunal in The Hague ruled in a case brought by the Philippines that China’s sweeping Nine-Dash Line claims had no legal basis under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Beijing rejected the ruling. Taiwan also rejected parts of the decision because it affected claims tied to Taiping Island.

South China Claims and Economic Zone Disputes

The Dialogue Continues

This coming Sunday is Holy Trinity Sunday. Nicodemus is oblivious to the two levels of meaning (John 3). He focuses on one meaning of “born anōthen” (“again”) and protests that what Jesus calls for is physiologically impossible (3:4). As in v. 2, Nicodemus’s categories of what is possible intrude into the conversation. On the level that Nicodemus understands Jesus’ words, Nicodemus’s protest is correct. It is impossible for a grown man to reenter his mother’s womb and be born a second time. Nicodemus’s protest is ironic, however, because his words are correct and incontestable on one level, but that level stands in conflict and tension with what Jesus intends by the expression “to be born anōthen.” Jesus’ words speak of a radical new birth, generated from above, but Nicodemus’s language and imagination do not stretch enough to include that offer.

Born of Water and the Spirit. In vv.5-8 Jesus provides a fresh set of images to move Nicodemus out of his misunderstanding. The expression “born of water and Spirit” (v. 5) interprets the phrase “to be born anōthen.” For the reader of this Gospel in the Christian community, the reference to water and the Spirit carries with it images of baptism.

Gail O’Day points out that the narrative also includes a listener, Nicodemus, who hears these words independent of any knowledge of Christian baptism.  She writes [550]:

Jesus’ words about birth from water and Spirit are comprehensible without a baptismal referent if one attends carefully to the verb for “born” (the passive of gennao ). In 3:4, Nicodemus drew Jesus’ attention to the birthing process with his words about his mother’s womb. The birth that Nicodemus envisions, the exit from the mother’s womb, is quite literally a birth out of water. The breaking of the waters of birth announces the imminent delivery of a child. In v. 5 Jesus plays on Nicodemus’s womb imagery to say that entrance into the kingdom of God will require a double birth: physical birth (“water”) and spiritual rebirth (“Spirit”). New life will be born from water and Spirit, no longer only from water. Yet the spiritual rebirth also does not void the physical birth. Spirit and flesh are held together; this is not a docetic understanding of human existence before God. Verse 6 supports this interpretation of v. 5, because its terms more directly underscore the two births of v. 5.

Most scholars see this as a secondary meaning at best – but then, most of them are men. Yet, the other scholars note that John is not “newspaper reporting” a conversation, but is in fact providing a narrative to the late 1st century church about meaning.

The early church clearly and indisputably understood baptism to be the sacramental enactment of Jesus’ promise of new birth. Thus baptismal reading as the primary meaning of  John 3:5-6 expands on the images of birth and new life that O’Day suggests are already contained in the text.

Born from Above as Born of the Spirit. In v. 7, Jesus returns to his initial metaphor, “you must be born anōthen “ The “you” is a second-person plural pronoun in the Greek, so that Jesus’ requirement of fresh birth is now addressed to the “we” of Nicodemus’s words in v. 2. Nicodemus resisted Jesus’ words about new birth the first time Jesus spoke them (vv. 3-4) and, in v. 7a Jesus warns him against repeating that response.

In v. 8, Jesus uses the image of the wind to explain the birth of which he speaks. The Greek word for “wind” (pneuma), like anōthen , has two inherent meanings; it means both “wind” and “spirit” (as does the Hebrew word ruah). Once again Jesus describes the new birth with a word that cannot be held to a single meaning. The word pneuma perfectly captures the essence of Jesus’ message: the wind/spirit blows where it wills; human beings can detect its presence but cannot chart its precise movements. Jesus’ offer of new birth is like the wind/spirit: a mystery beyond human knowledge and control.

Beyond our Understanding. Nicodemus responds to Jesus’ words exactly as Jesus warned him not to, in amazement. Nicodemus’s question in v. 9, “How can this happen?”  Once again his preconceptions of what is possible intrude on the conversation (cf. 3:2, 4) and prevent him from embracing Jesus’ words. One hears in Nicodemus’s incredulous question an echo of Sarah’s laugh in Gen 18:12. Nicodemus’s words of resistance are the last words he speaks in this story, although he will appear twice more in John (7:50¬52; 19:39-40).

Jesus responds to Nicodemus’s resistance with a quick and penetrating irony that characterizes much of the dialogue in the Fourth Gospel: “You are the teacher of Israel and you do not understand this?  (v. 10).  In 3:2-4 Nicodemus confidently asserted his knowledge of Jesus and God. Now Jesus turns that confident assertion back on Nicodemus. Neither Nicodemus’s credentials (Pharisee, ruler of the Jews, teacher of Israel) nor his self-professed knowledge have brought him closer to understanding Jesus.


Image credit: Rublev, Trinity icon, 15the century, Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius, Moscow, Public Domain