For decades, U.S. policy has been characterized by “strategic ambiguity.” Washington intentionally avoids answering two questions:

• Would the United States definitely defend Taiwan militarily?
• Would Taiwan be supported if it declared formal independence?

The purpose is to discourage both a Chinese attack on Taiwan and a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan. By leaving its response uncertain, the United States seeks to deter actions by either side that could trigger a conflict. Successive administrations, both Republican and Democratic, have generally pursued four goals: preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, deter the use of force by China, support Taiwan’s ability to defend itself, and avoid unilateral changes to the status quo by either Beijing or Taipei.

American concern about Taiwan is driven by several factors:

• strategic location – Taiwan sits near major sea lanes and occupies a key position in the Western Pacific.
• democratic values – Taiwan has evolved into a vibrant democratic society. Many American policymakers see support for Taiwan as consistent with broader U.S. support for democratic partners.
• economic importance – Taiwan plays a critical role in global technology supply chains, especially through Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSNC), the world’s leading advanced semiconductor manufacturer.

It is reminiscent of the 1900 policy of the United States: The China Open Door. The policy was focused on securing international agreement of equal opportunity for international trade and commerce in China, and respect for China’s administrative and territorial integrity. The articulation of the Open Door policy represented the growing American interest and involvement in East Asia at the turn of that century. Still seems to ring true today – ambiguity and all.

But what’s at stake for China? From Beijing’s perspective, the principal potential gain is political and strategic: completing national unification, strengthening regime legitimacy, and improving China’s position in the western Pacific. The principal risks are economic disruption, military losses, possible conflict with the United States and its allies, and the long-term challenge of governing a resistant Taiwanese population. As a result, many analysts believe Chinese leaders face a difficult calculation: the symbolic and strategic value of Taiwan is extraordinarily high, but the costs of achieving reunification by force could also be extraordinarily high and highly uncertain. The uncertainty itself, more than any single factor, is one reason why China has thus far relied primarily on military pressure, economic influence, and diplomatic efforts rather than launching an invasion.

Massive Economic Costs. This is arguably the greatest risk. China’s economy remains deeply connected to global trade, finance, and technology markets. An invasion could trigger international sanctions, restrictions on advanced technology imports, capital flight, reduced foreign investment and disruptions to maritime trade.

Military Casualties and Uncertainty. A cross-strait invasion would be among the most complex military operations attempted since the Normandy Landings because of rough seas in the Taiwan Strait, limited suitable landing beaches, dense urban areas, mountainous interior terrain, and a well prepared and trained defending military armed with advanced western nations military technology. Even if China ultimately prevailed, casualties could be very high and victory could take much longer than expected.

Even if you “win”, military conquest does not automatically produce political control. Taiwan has developed a distinct political identity over several decades. The majority of the people on Taiwan do not primarily identify as “Chinese.” Taiwanese is an identity they see as distinct from the people on mainline China. So, even after a successful invasion, China could face civil resistance, political unrest, security challenges, and long-term occupation costs. The postwar burden could persist for years or decades.

Although the United States maintains a policy of strategic ambiguity regarding Taiwan, Beijing cannot assume that Washington would remain uninvolved. An invasion could potentially draw in not just the United States, but also Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Australia – possibly even Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. The latter three control the Malacca Strait, a major choke point for oil, commodities, and most commercial shipping. What would invading Taiwan do to China’s international standing?

What is clear is that “One China” has been a long-standing goal of China/PRC and the regime of Xi Jinping has staked his legacy on reunification. In Chinese political discourse, reunification is often portrayed not merely as a policy objective but as a historical mission. Success could become a defining achievement comparable to other major milestones in modern Chinese history.

There is a lot at stake.

A Final Thought for this series… for the moment

The U.S. position is that it recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the government of China, maintains unofficial but robust relations with Taiwan, opposes any attempt to change Taiwan’s status by force, supports Taiwan’s self-defense, and seeks a peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences without formally endorsing either Taiwanese independence or Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.

Things are not “broke” so no need to fix it. Military action is certainly a quick way to break things:

One area in which China can not project the same power is over the Malacca Straits. 80% plus of China’s oil supply flows through these choke points as well as a huge amount of commercial shipping. It is China’s “Malacca Dilemma.” 

Malacca is just one choke point. There are others.